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Jacob A. Frenkel, Morris Goldstein, and Paul R.  Masson 
Coordination of macroeconomic policies is certainly not easy; maybe it is impossible. 
But  in its absence,  I  suspect nationalistic  solutions  will be  sought-trade  barriers, 
capital  controls,  and  dual  exchange-rate  systems.  War  among  nations  with  these 
weapons  is  likely  to  be  mutually  destructive.  Eventually,  they,  too,  would  evoke 
agitation for international coordination. 
James Tobin (1987, 68) 
I  believe that many of  the claimed  advantages of  cooperation  and coordination  are 
wrong, that there are substantial risks and disadvantages to the types of coordination 
that are envisioned,  and that an emphasis on international  coordination  can distract 
attention from the necessary changes in domestic policy. 
Martin Feldstein (1988, 3) 
1.1  Introduction 
This paper discusses the rationale and mechanisms for, and the effects of, 
international coordination of economic policies. Coordination is defined here, 
following Wallich (1984,85), as “a significant modification of national policies 
in recognition of international economic interdependence.”  The existence of 
a number of comprehensive surveys of the literature on coordination makes the 
task easier.* This discussion can, therefore, be selective and focus on a number 
of key issues that impinge on the advisability and practicality of strengthening 
policy coordination among the larger industrial countries. 
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This  paper is organized  as  follows.  Section  1.2 covers  economic  policy 
coordination  in  the  widest  sense  and  addresses  various  dimensions  of  the 
rationale for, and  scope of, coordination.  The terrain  covered  includes  the 
applicability of the ‘‘invisible hand” paradigm to decentralized economic policy 
decisions, barriers to coordination,  the range and specificity of  policies to be 
coordinated, the frequency of coordination, and the number of participants to be 
included in the coordination exercise. Section 1.3 narrows the discussion to mon- 
etary and fiscal policies and turns to the mechanisms or methods of coordination. 
The emphasis here is on the two broad issues of rules versus discretion and of 
single-indicator versus multiple-indicator appro ache^.^ A brief discussion is also 
included on the use of indicators in the ongoing Group of Seven (G-7) coordination 
process. 
Section 1.4 confronts the problem of how to infer the effects of coordina- 
tion.  A  number  of  empirical  experiments  are  carried  out  using  a  global 
macroeconomic model (MULTIMOD) developed in the International Mone- 
tary Fund. The policies considered include nominal GNP or money targeting, 
“smoothing”  rules for  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  that  imply  only  modest 
international  coordination,  and  more  activist  “target-zone’’  proposals  that 
place greater international conditions on national authorities in the conduct of 
monetary  and/or fiscal policies.  In one set of  “historical”  simulations,  we 
compare the results of simulated policies to the actual evolution of the world 
economy over the 1974-87  period. In the other set of simulations, we analyze 
the effects of various single shocks to particular behavioral relationships under 
alternative policy rules. 
1.2  Rationale for and Scope of Coordination 
The most logical starting point is to ask why international policy  coordi- 
nation  would  be  beneficial  in the  first place.  After all,  if  in  the  domestic 
economy the working of the invisible hand under pure competition translates 
independent decentralized decisions into a social optimum, why should not the 
same principle apply to policy decisions by countries in the world economy? 
The answer  is that  economic  policy  actions, particularly  those  of  larger 
countries, create quantitatively significant spillover effects or externalities for 
other countries, and that a global optimum requires that such externalities be 
taken into account in the decision-making calculus.  Coordination is then best 
seen as a facilitating mechanism for internalizing these externalities. 
This conclusion  can  perhaps  be  better  appreciated  by  emphasizing  the 
departures  from the  competitive  model  in today’s global economy.  Cooper 
(1987) has identified  several such departures, and his analysis merits  some 
extension here. 
Unlike the atomistic economic agents of the competitive model who base 
their consumption  and production  decisions on prices that are beyond  their 
control, larger countries exercise  a certain  degree of influence  over prices, 11  International  Economic Policy Coordination 
including the real exchange rate. This of course raises the specter that they will 
manipulate such prices to their own advantage and at the expense of  others. 
Two examples are frequently cited-one  dealing with inflation, and the other 
with real output and employment. Under floating rates, a Mundellian (1971) 
policy mix of tight monetary  and loose  fiscal policy  allows an appreciated 
currency to enhance a country’s disinflationary policy strategy-but  at the cost 
of making it harder for trading partners to realize their own disinflation targets. 
Similarly, under conditions of high capital mobility and sticky nominal wages, 
a monetary expansion under floating rates leads to a real depreciation and to 
an expansion of output and employment at home. But the flip side of the coin 
is that output and employment contract abr~ad.~  Seen in this light, the role of 
coordination  is  to  prevent-or  to  minimize-such  intentional  as  well  as 
unintentional “beggar-thy-neighbor’’  practices.  Most international monetary 
constitutions  have  injunctions  against  ‘‘manipulating”  exchange  rates  or 
international reserves. 
The existence  of  public  goods constitutes  a  second  important point  of 
departure from the competitive model. 
When there are N currencies, there can be only N -  1 independent exchange 
rate targets. Similarly, not all countries can achieve independently set targets 
for current  account  surpluses.  Adherents  of  decentralized  policymaking- 
sometimes rather inappropriately labelled the ‘‘German school”-argue  that 
such inconsistencies provide no justification for coordination. Much as in the 
competitive model, the economic system will generate signals-in  the form of 
changes in exchange rates, interest rates, prices, and incomes-that  will lead 
to an adjustment of targets such that they eventually become consistent.  If, 
however, the path to consistency involves large swings in real exchange rates, 
or even more problematically, the imposition of restrictions on trade and capital 
flows, then reliance on decentralized policymaking may not be globally optimal. 
Implicit in this conclusion is the notion that a certain degree of stability in real 
exchange rates and an open international trading and financial system are valued 
in and of themselves as public goods (in contrast, the market signals that resolve 
supply/demand inconsistencies in the competitive model, are not regarded as 
public goods). If that is accepted, there is a positive role for coordination, both 
to identify target inconsistencies at an early stage and to resolve them in ways 
that do not produce too little of the public good(s).6 It is of course possible for 
groups of countries who value the public good highly to attempt to obtain more 
of it by setting up “regional”  zones of exchange rate stability or of free trade, 
and some have done just that  (including the establishment  of  the European 
Monetary System [EMS]).’  But the essence of a public good is that it will tend 
to be undersupplied so long as some large suppliers or  users act in a decentralized 
fashion. 
Once  the  realm  of  atomistic  competitors  is  left  and  that  of  nontrivial 
spillovers of policies is entered-be  it via goods, asset, or labor markets-the 
possibility  arises that choices  made independently by  national  governments 12  J. A. Frenkel/M. Goldstein/P. R. Masson 
would  not  be  as effective in  achieving their objectives as policies that  are 
coordinated with other governments.' Whereas any single country acting alone 
may be reluctant to follow expansionary policies designed to counter a global 
deflationary shock for fear of unduly worsening its external balance, coordi- 
nated expansion by  many countries will loosen the external constraint and 
permit each country to move closer to internal balance. In  addition, coordi- 
nation may assist the policymaking process by mobilizing peer pressure to help 
provide governments with the political will to make difficult choices in the face 
of opposition from domestic pressure groups. The success of Weight Watchers 
provides an intuitive parallel: while overweight individuals know what needs 
to be done to meet their targets and could in principle do it entirely on their 
own, many apparently find it helpful to subject themselves to peer pressure and 
to engage the moral support of  others in like circumstances. 
All of  this establishes a presumption that there can be valid reasons for 
deviating from the tradition of decentralized decision-making when it comes 
to economic policy, that  is, that there is scope for coordination. This pre- 
sumption is reinforced by two empirical observations. The first is that the world 
economy of  1990 is considerably more open and integrated than that of  1950, 
or 1960, or even of  1970. Not only have simple ratios of imports or exports 
to GNP increased but also-and  probably more fundamentally-global  capital 
markets have become more integrated (Fischer 1988;  Frenkell983,1986). With 
larger spillovers, there is more at stake in how one manages interdependence. 
Second, there is by now widespread recognition that the insulating properties 
of floating exchange rates are more modest than was suspected prior to their 
introduction in  1973.9 
But a presumption that cooperation could be beneficial is not the same as 
a guarantee-nor  does  it preclude  the  existence  of  sometimes formidable 
obstacles to its implementation. 
Suppose national policymakers have a predilection for inflationary policies 
but  are restrained  from  implementing them by  the  concern that  relatively 
expansionary monetary policy will bring on a devaluation (or depreciation). 
Yet,  as outlined by Rogoff  (1985), if  all countries pursue such inflationary 
policies simultaneously, none has to worry about the threat of  devaluation. 
Here, coordination may actually weaken discipline by easing the balance of 
payments constraint. In a similar vein, as noted by Feldstein (1988) there is 
the potential risk that a coordinated attempt to stabilize a pattern of  nominal 
or real exchange rates could take place in an inappropriately high aggregate 
rate of inflation. Equally troublesome would be a coordination of fiscal policies 
that yielded an aggregate fiscal deficit for the larger countries that put undue 
upward pressure on world interest rates. The basic point is straightforward: 
there is nothing in the coordination process in'and of itself that reduces the 
importance of sound macroeconomic policies (Bockelmann 1988). There can 
be coordination around good policies and coordination around bad ones-just 
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and good floats and bad floats (Frenkel 1985). Welfare improvements are not 
automatic. 
It is only realistic, too, to acknowledge that there are barriers to the exercise 
of coordination. Four of the more prominent ones are worth mentioning. First, 
international policy bargains that involve shared objectives can be frustrated 
if  some policy instruments are treated as objectives in themselves. Schultze 
(1988), for example, offers the view that it would have been difficult to have 
reached a bargain on target zones for exchange rates in the early 1980s given 
President Reagan's  twin  commitments to  increasing defense spending and 
cutting taxes. In some other countries, the constraints on policy instruments 
may lie in different areas-including  structural policies-but  the implications 
are the same. 
Second, there can at times be sharp disagreements among countries about 
the effects that policy changes have on policy targets. In some cases, these 
differences may extend beyond the size to even the sign of  various policy 
impact multipliers."  The harder it is to agree on how the world works, the 
harder it is to reach agreement on a jointly designed set of policies. 
Third, while most countries have experienced a marked increase in openness 
over the past few decades, there remain huge cross-country differences in the 
degree of interdependence. Large countries-the  United States being the classic 
case in point-are  generally less affected than small countries by other coun- 
tries'  policies. Coordination-as  Bryant (1987) has recently emphasized-is 
not a matter of altruism. It is rather the manifestation of mutual self-interest. 
To the extent that large countries are less beset by spillovers and feedbacks than 
small ones, the formers' incentive to coordinate on a continuous basis may be 
lower.''  In this regard, the high degree of trade interdependence shared by 
members of the EMS can be seen as a positive factor in reinforcing incentives 
to coordinate in that group. 
Finally, as Polak (1981) has reminded us, in terms of  national priorities, 
international  bargaining  typically  comes  after  domestic  bargaining.  More 
specifically, the compromise of growth and inflation objectives at the national 
level may leave little room for further compromise on demand measures at the 
international level. 
These barriers to coordination  should not be  overestimated.  One of  the 
clearest  examples  of  true  coordination-the  Bonn  Economic  Summit  of 
1978-occurred  just when domestic bargaining over the same issues was most 
intense. l2 The growing integration of capital markets-of  which the global 
stock market crash of  October  1987 is but one reminder-has  brought the 
implications of interdependence home to even large countries, and continued 
empirical work on multicountry models should be able progressively to whittle 
down the margin of disagreement on the effects of policies. Still, as readers 
of Sherlock Holmes will be aware, sometimes the most telling clue is that the 
hounds didn't bark.  If  the scope for coordination is to expand beyond the 
efforts of the past, these obstacles will need to be overcome. 14  J. A. Frenkel/M. GoldsteinlP. R. Masson 
Turning  from  the  rationale  to  the  scope  for  coordination,  a  key  issue 
concerns the appropriate range and depth of policies to be coordinated. 
The case for supporting a wide-ranging,  multi-issue approach to coordina- 
tion is that it increases the probability of concluding some policy bargains that 
benefit all parties (Putnam and Bayne  1984), that favorable spillover effects 
are generated across negotiating issues, and that improved economic perfor- 
mance today depends as much on trade and structural policies as on exchange 
rate and demand policies. Exhibit A is the Bonn Economic Summit of  1978 
where commitments to accelerate growth by Japan and the Federal Republic 
of Germany were exchanged for a commitment by the United States to come 
to grips with its inflation and oil problems,  and where agreement on macro- 
economic  and  energy  policies  has  been  credited  with  reinforcing  pro- 
gress on the Tokyo Round  of Multilateral Trade Negotiations  (Putnam and 
Henning  1986). 
The defense of a narrower approach to coordination rests on the arguments 
that negotiation costs rise rapidly with the spread of issues under consideration 
(Artis and Ostry 1986), that prospects for implementation of agreements dim 
as the number of jurisdictional  spheres expands (i.e., finance ministers can 
negotiate  agreements  but  fiscal  policy  is  typically  the  responsibility  of 
legislatures,  while  monetary  policy  is the  province  of  independent  central 
banks); and that heated disputes on some issues (such as the stance of monetary 
and fiscal policies) can frustrate the chance for agreements in other areas (like 
defense  and  foreign  assistance)  where  coordination  might be  more  fruitful 
(Feldstein  1988). In addition,  a case could be made that coordination is only 
likely in areas where there is a consensus about the effects of common policies 
(Cooper 1988). 
In  view  of  these  conflicting  considerations,  it  is  hard  to fault  present 
institutional  practices  on  the  range  of  coordination. Those  practices  entail 
high-frequency  coordination on narrow issues in a multitude of forums (such 
as the  IMF,  the  Organization  of  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
[OECD],  the  Bank  of  International  Settlements  [BIS],  and  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]);I3 less frequent (say, biannual) and 
wider coordination at a higher level in more limited forums (such as the IMF’s 
Interim  Committee, or the  G-7 major  industrial  countries);  and  even less 
frequent (annual), wider-yet coordination at the highest level (heads of  state 
and  of  governments  at  the  economic  summits). Thus, there are occasional 
opportunities for multi-issue bargaining, but without the exponential increase 
in negotiation costs that might ensue if  this were the order of the day. All in 
all, probably not a bad compromise. 
The “depth”  of  coordination  covers the degree of  specificity  and disag- 
gregation within a given policy area. Here, two issues arise-one  dealing with 
fiscal policy,  and the other with  structural policies.  A strong implication of 
recent  research  is that  aggregate  measures,  such  as the  central  or general 15  International Economic Policy Coordination 
government fiscal deficit, are not likely to be a good guide to the effects of 
$fiscal policies on macroeconomic  variables such as the current account, the 
exchange rate, and the rate of interest (Frenkel and Razin  1987b). The reason 
is that such effects depend on how the deficit is altered: that is, taxes versus 
expenditures, expenditures on tradables versus nontradables, taxes on invest- 
ment versus those on saving, fiscal action by a country with a current account 
surplus versus a deficit,  and anticipated versus unanticipated  policies.  This 
suggests that more specificity in coordination-quite  apart from its positive 
effect on the ability to monitor the implementation of agreed upon policies- 
would be desirable.  It is notable that the Louvre Accord of February  1987 
among the G-7 specified not only quantitative targets for budget deficits but 
also some quantitative guidelines for how these overall fiscal targets were to 
be achieved.14 
In  the  area  of  structural  policies,  a  good  case  can  also be  made  for 
specificity-but  on somewhat different grounds. Here, coordination may often 
best  be  interpreted  not  as the  simultaneous  application  of  the  same policy 
instrument in different doses or directions across countries, but rather as the 
simultaneous application of different policy in~truments'~-with each country 
adopting the policy best tailored to its particular structural weakness. l6 In some 
cases, this may imply reducing impediments to labor mobility or to market- 
determined wages; in others, it may  mean  increasing incentives for private 
investment relative to those for private saving; and in still others, it may mean 
changes in the trade and distribution system. The simultaneous application of 
the  policy  measures  across  countries  may  be  necessary  to  overcome  the 
blocking tactics of domestic pressure groups and to enhance the credibility of 
the exercise. Again, the depth or specificity of coordination can be as relevant 
as the range. 
Another salient issue concerns the question of when to coordinate. There has 
been,  and continues to be, wide variation in the  frequency  of  coordination 
across different forums-ranging  from one-of-a-kind meetings like the  197  1 
Smithsonian Conference on exchange rates to the near continuous discussion 
and decision-making at the executive boards of the IMF and the World Bank. 
One position  is that, given  the  constraints,  true coordination  cannot  be 
expected to be more than an episodic, regime-preserving effort. Dini (1988) 
has recently  argued that  international  considerations  still play only a small 
factor in policymaking,  and that only at times of crisis is a common interest 
in coordinated action clearly recognized. l7  Some might even go further and 
argue that the reservoir of international compromise should be conserved for 
situations where there is a high probability of a policy deal and where failure 
to reach an agreement would carry a high cost. 
Our view is that both the likelihood and effectiveness of coordination will 
be enhanced when it is aregular, ongoing  process-and  for at least three reasons. 
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for policy bargains (by facilitating, for example, phasing of policy measures). 
What  should  count  in  assessing  the  gains  to  coordination  is  the  present 
discounted value of  welfare-improving  policy  agreements over an extended 
period-not  the welfare change in a single period. Second, as suggested in the 
game-theoretic literature, the existence of repeated bargaining strengthens the 
role  of  reputational  considerations  in  coordination. ’’  In  contrast,  when 
coordination is a once-and-for-all or episodic exercise, there is a higher risk 
that agreed policies will never be implemented because of the much discussed 
problem  of  time inconsistency,  that  is, the temptation  to renege on earlier 
policy commitments when it later becomes advantageous to do so (Kydland 
and Prescott 1977; Calvo 1978). To be effective, coordination agreements need 
to pass through the market filter of credibility, and credibility is more likely 
if  sticking  to  the  agreement  enhances  reputation,  which  in  turn  allows 
profitable  bargains  to  be  struck  in  the  future. Third, once coordination  is 
established as a routine ongoing process, there is apt to be more freedom of 
policy maneuver for all participants than when negotiations are conducted in 
a crisis atmosphere and when disagreements-which  after all are inevitable- 
may be inappropriately seen as signaling the collapse of coordination itself. l9 
A final question concerns the size of  the coordinating group, that is, who 
should  coordinate.  Again,  existing  practice  does not  provide  a  definitive 
answer. Among the industrial countries, we have the Group of Seven and the 
Group of Ten. For the developing countries, there are the Group of Twenty- 
Four and  the Group of  Seventy-Seven.  And  in  the  executive  board  of  the 
Fund-where  industrial and developing countries alike are represented-there 
are  twenty-two  representatives  of  various  country  groupings-a  Group of 
Twenty-Two. 
Among the factors that should influence the size of the coordinating group, 
three would  seem to stand out. First,  to the extent that the raison  d’&e  of 
coordination is the internalization of externalities,  the group should include 
those countries whose policies generate the largest externalities.  This argues 
for  including  the  largest  industrial  countries.  Second, there  is  the  general 
proposition that the costs of negotiation, and conflicts that might endanger the 
continuity of the exercise, increase significantly  with the number of players. 
This argues for a relatively  small group. Third, and pointing in the opposite 
direction, a small group runs the risk of concluding policy agreements which 
are beneficial to the direct participants-but  which are not satisfactory to those 
countries not sitting at the coordination table.20 In this connection, it is relevant 
that  the  managing  director  of  the  Fund  participates  in  G-7  coordination 
meetings.  Since the Fund’s membership includes not only the larger industrial 
countries  but  also  the  smaller  industrial  countries,  as  well  as  most  of  the 
developing countries, one rationale for the managing director’s participation is 
that  it  provides  a  systemic  perspective  and  evaluation  on  proposed  policy 
agreements-while  still keeping  the meeting  small enough  for administrative 
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1.3  Mechanisms of Coordination 
This  section  shifts  the  focus  from  whether  to  coordinate  to  how  to 
coordinate. More specifically, the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
mechanisms  of  coordination  are discussed, with particular  attention  to the 
issues  of  rules  versus  discretion  and  of  single-  versus  multi-indicator  ap- 
proaches.  The use of economic  indicators in the ongoing G-7 coordination 
process is also outlined. 
It is not surprising that many of the issues that emerged during the long and 
continuing debate on the relative merits of rules versus discretion in domestic 
economic  policy  should  have  resurfaced  in  the  dialogue  on  international 
economic  policy  coordination.  After  all,  the  present  system  of  managed 
floating, even as it has evolved since the Plaza Agreement of September 1985, 
is much closer to a pure discretion than to a pure rules model. In this regard, 
the gold standard with its automatic specie flow mechanism, the adjustable peg 
system with its clear implications for the subordination of domestic monetary 
policy to the exchange rate (except during fundamental disequilibria), the EMS 
with its parity grid and divergence indicator, target zone proposals with their 
trigger  for  coordination  discussions  whenever  the  actual  exchange  rate 
threatens to breach the zone, and pure floating with its complete prohibition 
on all official intervention in the exchange market-all  can be considered less 
discretionary than the present exchange rate system. 
Those who support a more rule-based approach to international economic 
policy rest their case on essentially four arguments. First, the most promising 
route to eliminating any excess demand for coordination in the world economy 
is not by increasing the supply, but rather by decreasing the demand (or the 
need) for coordination (Polak 1981; Kenen  1987). That decrease in demand, 
in turn, can best be brought about by the application of  simple policy rules, 
such as the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. In the process, one would 
eliminate-so  the argument goes-most  of the negotiation costs and burden- 
sharing conflicts that are intrinsic to more discretionary systems. Second, rules 
are  regarded  as  the  only  viable  mechanism  for  imposing  discipline  on 
economic policymakers who might otherwise manipulate the instruments of 
policy for their own objectives.’l  Third, rules are regarded as enhancing the 
predictability  of  policy  actions  and  thereby  improving  the private  sector’s 
ability to make informed resource allocation decisions.”  Fourth, rules are seen 
as  a  way  of  preventing  destabilizing  fine-tuning,  and  thus  of  providing 
protection against the lack of knowledge about how the economy operates. 
The main counterarguments  in  favor of  a discretionary  approach are the 
following.  First,  rule-based  adjustment  systems  often  turn  out  to be  less 
automatic  in  practice  than  in  theory.  For example, the  automaticity  of  the 
specie flow mechanism under the historical gold  standard was often under- 
mined by the proclivity of authorities to offset or sterilize the effect of  gold 
flows (Cooper  1982; U.S. Congress  1982). 18  J. A. FrenkellM. Goldstein/P. R. Masson 
Second, rules will impart discipline to the conduct of macroeconomic policy 
only to the extent that the penalties for breaking the rules are significant enough 
to ensure that the rules are followed. The Bretton Woods rule that countries 
should consult with the Fund once there was a cumulative parity change of  10 
percent  or more,  while complied  with  in  a technical  sense, fell  short in  a 
substantive  sense  of  its  original  purpose.  The  discussion  surrounding  the 
revision of the original Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction targets in the United 
States is a more recent case in point. History could in fact be seen as being just 
as kind  to the  proposition  that  the policy  regime  adjusts to the  amount  of 
discipline  that  countries  want  to  have-as  to  the  reverse  (Goldstein  1980, 
1984; Frenkel 1982; Frenkel and Goldstein 1986). Also, care needs to be taken 
to  separate  the  effects  of  policy  rules  on  economic  outcomes  from other 
influences. In this connection,  the  oft-made  argument  that the  EMS was  a 
major determinant of the  1979-85  disinflation  in Europe would  seem to be 
based on shaky ground.23 
Third, it  is by  no means clear that rules are necessary to obtain the bene- 
fits of  greater  predictability  of  policy.  For example, the  practice of  prean- 
nouncing money-supply targets-sometimes  accompanied by announcements 
of  public  sector borrowing  requirements-provides  the markets  with  infor- 
mation on the authorities’ policy intentions, but stops well short of a rigid rule. 
Finally,  while  rules  diminish  the  risk  emanating  from fine-tuning,  they 
increase the risk stemming from lack of adaptability to changes in the operating 
en~ironment.~~  The idea of a “crawling-peg’’  rule based on inflation differ- 
entials drew quite a few supporters in the 1960s as the right antidote for sticky 
nominal  exchange rates.  Yet  its  neglect of  the  need  for real exchange rate 
changes now seems more serious in light of the real economic disturbances of 
the early  1970~~~  More recently, the crumbling of the link between narrow 
monetary aggregates and the ultimate targets of monetary policy in the face of 
large-scale financial innovation and institutional change has reminded us anew 
of the limitations of  policy rules. 
In light of all this, there may not be any attractive alternative to conducting 
economic policy coordination in a judgmental  way. 
Even after the choice is made about coordinating via  rules or discretion, 
there remains the decision of whether to coordinate around a single indicator 
or a set of indicators.26 
There are two main considerations that are typically advanced to support the 
single-indicator approach. One is that it avoids overcoordination of policies by 
preserving for each country freedom of action over those policies not used to 
reach the single target variable. Thus, for example, if the exchange rate is the 
focus of coordination, monetary policy will be constrained, but other policies 
will be less affected. Implicit in this line of argument is the view that attempts 
to place many policies under international coordination will ultimately prove 
self-defeating  and  may  even induce  national  authorities  to  compensate  by 
exercising greater independence in uncoordinated policy instruments, such as 
trade policy  (Frenkel  1975). 19  International Economic Policy Coordination 
The second, and probably  more important, defense of  a single-indicator 
approach is that it sends a clear signal to markets about the course of future 
policy.  If,  for  example,  the  monetary  authorities  commit  themselves  to 
maintain  a fixed exchange rate within a given band, then movements of  the 
exchange rate provide an unambiguous guide for monetary policy. A similar 
message would derive from a nominal income target for monetary or fiscal 
policy, with the exchange rate left to determination of the market. In contrast, 
a multi-indicator approach increases the authorities’ scope for discretion since 
they  can appeal  to the conflicting  messages  coming from different  indica- 
tors.  In cases where the authorities’ past record of policy performance  has 
been weak  and where  a single objective  of policy  is predominant  (such as 
disinflation), a single-indicator framework for coordination can carry signif- 
icant advantages in the battle to restore credibility to policy. 
But  relying  on a single policy  indicator can also carry  substantial risks. 
Perhaps the most serious one is that the single indicator can send weak-or 
even false signals-about  the need for changes in other policies that are not 
being coordinated. This is perhaps best illustrated by considering the problem 
of errant fiscal policy under a regime of fixed exchange rates or of target zones. 
First, consider fixed rates. With high capital mobility, a fiscal expansion will 
yield  an incipient positive interest rate differential,  a capital inflow, and an 
overall balance of payments surplus-not  a deficit. Here, exchange rate fixity 
helps  to finance-and  by  no means  disciplines-irresponsible  fiscal policy 
(Frenkel and Goldstein  1988a). Only if and when the markets expect fiscal 
deficits to be monetized will they force the authorities to choose between fiscal 
policy adjustments and de~aluation.~~  The better the reputation of the authorities, 
the longer in coming will be the discipline of markets, that is, the exchange rate 
will provide only a weak and late signal for policy adjustment. In this connection, 
it is worth observing that whereas the EMS has produced a notable convergence 
of monetary policy, convergence of fiscal policy has not taken place (Tanzi and 
Ter-Minassian 1987; Holtham, Keating, and Spencer 1987). 
Next, rerun the same fiscal expansion under a target zone regime, where the 
zones are to be defended by monetary policy. In such a scenario,  the appreciation 
of the currency induced by the fiscal action will prompt a loosening of monetary 
policy to keep the rate from breaching the zone. Here, coordination around a 
single indicator, namely, the exchange rate, will have exacerbated-not  cor- 
rected-the  basic cause of the problems.** The single indicator would have sent 
the wrong signal for policy adjustment. 
In contrast, a multi-indicator approach to coordination-assuming  that the 
list of indicators included monetary and fiscal policy variables-would  not be 
susceptible  to this  weak  or false  signal  problem.  This is  because  such an 
approach goes directly to the basic  stance of  fiscal  and monetary policies, 
rather than passing through the medium of the exchange rate. If, for example, 
the impetus for coordination was a misalignment of exchange rates, and if the 
root  cause of  the misalignment  was  an inappropriate  stance  andlor  mix of 
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But all is not a bed of  roses here either. While all effective approaches to 
coordination require a consistency of policy instruments and targets within and 
across countries, this requirement of consistency or compatibility can take an 
added prominence when authorities make public a set of  targets and intended 
courses for policy instruments. 
Two aspects merit explicit mention. One is that exchange rate targets-or 
even  concerted views  on the  existing  pattern  of  exchange rates-must  be 
consistent with the announced course of monetary and fiscal policies. Without 
that consistency, attempts to provide the market with an anchor for medium- 
term exchange rate expectations are likely to prove fruitless. 
The second point is that the credibility of multiple policy targets also hinges 
on the constraints on policy instruments. Two such constraints are the striking 
inflexibility of  fiscal policy in almost all industrial countries (Tanzi 1988), and 
the limited ability of sterilized exchange market intervention to affect the level 
of  the exchange rate over the medium-term, unless  of  course it  provides  a 
signal about the future course of  policies  (Mussa  1981; Jurgensen  1983). A 
relevant concern is that limitations on other policy instruments may wind up 
with monetary policy being asked to carry too heavy a burden-with  primary 
responsibility for maintaining internal and external balance. In such a case, any 
contribution  that  a multi-indicator  approach  to coordination  could  make to 
enhancing the predictability of policies would also be diminished. This is so 
because a shock to the system-such  as the October 1987 global stock market 
crash-might  raise in the minds of market participants the question of whether 
monetary policy would serve its internal or external master. 
Some of  the broad issues dealing with mechanisms of coordination can be 
more concretely illustrated by reviewing several of  the salient features of the 
use of indicators in the ongoing G-7 coordination  process. 
Indicators assist the policy coordination process in at least four ways. First, 
they  are  used  to help  identify  likely  inconsistencies  between  prospective 
policies and targets, as well as among targets themselves-both  within and 
across  countries.  Second, they  serve as  a  monitoring  device to ascertain 
whether  short-term policy  actions and  performance  are  “on  track”  with 
respect to earlier announced medium-term projections and objectives. Third, 
indicators  are  employed  to  help  gauge  the  international  implications  of 
domestic  policies  and performance for variables  such as external payments 
positions and exchange rates, and to help reach judgments about whether such 
implications  are  desirable and  sustainable.  Finally,  indicators  serve as  a 
common data base and terms of reference for assessing the current economic 
situation and policy options; in their absence, policy discussions could become 
bogged down by disagreements on “what  is”-to  say nothing  about  what 
should be. 
The idea of using indicators in multilateral surveillance predates the recent 
strengthening of coordination. In 1972-74,  a working group of the Committee 
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objective  indicators might be used  to allocate the burden  of  adjustment  to 
international payments disequilibriums (IMF 1974). That work was abandoned 
with the move to floating exchange rates because it was thought-erroneously, 
with the benefit of  hindsight-that  problems of  balance of payments adjust- 
ment would henceforth  be less serious (Crockett  1987). In the wake of the 
Plaza Agreement, new life was breathed into the use of indicators at the April 
1986 meeting of the Interim Committee. Its communiquk suggested, inter alia, 
that  “An  approach worth exploring  further was the formulation  of a set of 
objective  indicators  related  to  policy  actions  and  economic  performance, 
having  regard  to  a  medium-term  framework”  (IMF  1986).  The  Tokyo 
Economic Summit of May  1986 gave further support to the use of indicators 
in  the  G-7  coordination  process.  The  Tokyo  Economic  Declaration  also 
specified that the list of indicators should include: GNP and domestic demand 
growth, inflation, unemployment,  trade and current account positions,  mon- 
etary conditions,  fiscal balances,  exchange rates, and international reserves. 
In terms of  our earlier discussion,  the application of  indicators within the 
G-7 coordination exercise is better characterized as a discretionary, multiple- 
indicator approach than  as a rule-based,  single-indicator  one. As  hinted  at 
earlier, these two characteristics of the present approach are related:  so long 
as countries have multiple objectives and weight them differently, a multiple- 
indicator  approach  may  be  the  only  politically  feasible  one;  and  once a 
multiple-indicator approach is adopted, the more likely it is to be discretionary 
than  rule-based.  Indeed,  there  has  been  widespread  agreement  in  official 
circles that indicators should be used as an analytical framework for coordi- 
nation discussions rather than as automatic triggers for policy actions. 
Mention  should  also  be  made  of  two  recent  initiatives  in  the  use  of 
indicators.  As proposed at the Venice Economic Summit in 1987 and incor- 
porated  in  subsequent  coordination  meetings,  aggregate  indicators  for  the 
G-7 as a whole have been added to the list of individual-country  indicators. 
Aggregate indicators for the group may include such variables as the growth 
rates of real GNP and of domestic demand, the current account position, and 
the  real  exchange  rate.  Aggregate  indicators  are  intended  to  fulfill  two 
purposes: to capture the effects of policies of G-7 countries on countries not 
directly sitting at the table, and to gauge whether the overall stance of policies 
in major countries is biased toward expansion or contraction. On the first point, 
alternative policy  packages  among the  larger industrial countries  may  have 
quite different implications for developing countries, depending on how they 
affect such variables as world interest rates, world economic activity, and the 
volume of world trade. Aggregate indicators are a shorthand mechanism for 
inferring the magnitude of  these linkages between the  industrial and devel- 
oping countries. On the second point, focus on individual-country indicators- 
for instance, on real  exchange rates-does  not  give a reading  on  whether 
aggregate policy is too inflationary  or deflationary.  In fact, it  was this  very 
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contraction which prompted former U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker and U.K. 
Chancellor  Lawson,  at the  1987 Fund-Bank  Annual Meeting,  to propose  a 
commodity-price basket indicator. This aggregate indicator is intended to serve 
as a potential “early  warning signal” of emerging inflationary or deflationary 
pressures. The basket includes prices of primary commodities that are traded 
on world markets and are widely consumed. Issues arise in the construction 
of the basket about the treatment of oil, the relative weights to be applied to 
the component  commodities, and the  currency  denomination  of  the  index. 
Preliminary econometric work suggests that a commodity-price indicator does 
have some value as a leading indicator of movements in G-7 consumer prices 
(Boughton and Branson  1988). 
1.4  The Effects of Coordination 
Identifying key issues related to the rationale and mechanisms for economic 
policy coordination is one thing; attempting to infer its effects is quite another. 
The latter is obviously an empirical question that requires for analysis some 
type of quantitative economic model. 
Efforts to gauge the effects of international economic policy coordination 
or of alternative international monetary arrangements fall into two categories. 
One strand of the literature compares the value of  a welfare function where 
each country maximizes welfare independently with that where the countries 
maximize  a joint welfare function.  Two controversial  findings  are that  the 
gains from coordination are likely to be “small”  for the largest countries and 
that the gains can even be negative if countries coordinate using the “wrong” 
model of the world e~onomy.’~ 
These findings should not be used as an indictment of coordination-for  at 
least five reasons. First, a comparison of optimal uncoordinated with optimal 
coordinated policies may not be generalizable to the more relevant comparison 
of suboptimal uncoordinated with suboptimal coordinated policies. In partic- 
ular,  the  link  between  pressures  for protectionism  on  the  one  hand,  and 
recession and exchange rates on the  other, could result  in quite a different 
counterfactual (i.e., what would happen in the absence of coordination) from 
that assumed in these studies.30 To take a specific example, in evaluating the 
effects  of  the  Plaza  Agreement  of  September  1985, one  should  ask  how 
protectionist pressures in the U.S. Congress might have evolved in its absence. 
Second, some of the gains from coordination may be unobservable (unwritten 
pledges  to  alter  policies  in the  future), or difficult  to  separate  from  less 
ambitious forms of cooperation (exchange of information across countries), or 
may extend beyond the realm of macroeconomic  policy  (joint measures  to 
combat terrorism, to harmonize international fare schedules for air travel, and 
so on). Third, a judgment that gains from coordination are small presupposes 
some standard of comparison. Would the gains from international coordination 
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economic agencies  within a national  g~vernment?~’  Fourth,  empirical esti- 
mates of gains from coordination have typically compared policies that do not 
exploit the incentive governments have to adhere to agreements in order to 
enhance their reputation for consistency. Currie, Levine, and Vidalis (1987) 
argue, in contrast, that comparison of  ‘‘reputational”  policies  shows large 
gains. Fifth, the danger that coordination may reduce welfare because policy- 
makers use the wrong model(s) is greatest if  they  ignore model uncertainty. 
If, however, policymakers recognize that they do  not know the true model and 
take  this  uncertainty  into account,  policy  may  be  set  in  a  more cautious 
fashion,  with  positive  effects on the  gains from coordination (Ghosh  and 
Masson  1988). 
The second strain of the empirical literature attempts to quantify the effects 
of  specific policy  proposals  (such  as  the  introduction  of  target  zones)  by 
comparing them either with a baseline that describes the current policy stance, 
or with  historical  values  for the macroeconomic variables  of  interest. This 
typically involves the simulation of a global econometric model. To date, most 
attention has been paid to rule-based proposals  for policy coordination that 
focus on real effective exchange rates.  Two examples of  such studies are 
Edison, Miller, and Williamson (1987) and Currie and Wren-Lewis (1987). 
They  compare  simulated  outcomes  of  cooperative  policy  rules  to  recent 
historical experience. Both of these studies, however, are open to the classic 
Lucas (1976) critique that, due to the endogeneity of expectations of economic 
agents, as well as other endogenous responses to the policy regime, estimates 
of “structural parameters’ ’ will differ under different policy regimes; in these 
studies, expectations are formed in a mechanistic fashion-independent  of the 
policy regime. 
In this paper, we present some preliminary rule-based simulations derived 
from a global macroeconomic model developed in the research department of 
the  IMF  and  called  MULTIMOD.  Two  sets  of  simulations  results  are 
reported.  The  first  set  might  be  called  historical  simulations.  Here,  we 
address two questions:  (a) whether a smoother path of  monetary and fiscal 
policies would have produced a smoother path for real exchange rates, real 
output,  and  inflation  than  that  observed  historically;  and  (b)  what  the 
variability of policy instruments would be under a simple or extended “target 
zone”  scheme  where  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  is  treated  as  an 
intermediate target (Williamson 1985 [ 19831; Williamson and Miller 1987). 
In these historical simulations, the “effects” of coordination are generated by 
comparing  the  counterfactual  simulations  to  a  baseline  simulation  where 
MULTIMOD is constrained to replicate the historical data over 1974-87  by 
including  the appropriate residuals  in each equation.  These  same residuals 
are  also used  in  the  counterfactual  simulations,  each of  which  postulates 
that policy would have been different in some way from its historical stance. 
Our  second  set  of  simulations-for  convenience,  labeled  single-shock 
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individual  shocks to particular behavioral relationships  in the model. More 
specifically, we consider shocks to the demand for money, to aggregate supply, 
to aggregate  demand, to export demand, and to portfolio preferences. Re- 
sponses to these shocks are then examined under alternative policy rules. In 
addition to the coordinated rules of  simple and extended target zones, we also 
study monetary targeting and nominal GNP targeting.  In short, the objective 
is to see if, when, and how certain rules are likely to perform better than others. 
It could be objected that the rules we consider do not constitute  “coordi- 
nation” in the sense of joint utility maximization, which is the focus of the first 
strand of literature discussed above. While true, there is certainly an element 
of coordination in such rules, in the usual meaning of the term (see Frankel, 
ch. 3  in  this  volume).  In  particular,  target  zones  would  have  to  involve 
agreement  concerning  a  consistent set  of  targets;  because  of  the N - 1 
problem, targets for real effective exchange rates cannot be chosen indepen- 
dently. 
By virtue of using MULTIMOD for the simulations, our approach differs 
from most earlier work in two important respects. One is that expectations are 
forward-looking and reflect the stance of policy. This permits expectations to 
differ across different policy regimes.32 For instance, if it is known that the 
monetary authorities will resist movements away from an ‘‘equilibrium”  level 
for the exchange rate, then  this  will  condition the  value expected for the 
exchange rate in the future. In this sense, the results are less subject to the 
Lucas  critique  than  most of  previous  work.33 In a related  vein, the  model 
attributes complete credibility to the government’s policy stance and assumes 
that the private sector forms its expectations in a fashion that turns out to be 
correct ex post. Thus, it gives a potentially powerful influence to changes in 
present and future policies.  Second, although this paper concentrates on the 
larger industrial countries, MULTIMOD contains a fully specified developing 
country block. 
Before  proceeding  to  a  capsule  summary  of  MULTIMOD  and  to  the 
simulations  themselves, it is worth emphasizing a caveat. We are in a still early 
stage of  applying  MULTIMOD  to policy  coordination  issues. The results 
should, therefore, be considered tentative, preliminary, and relevant only to a 
few rule-based proposals. Much more will need to be learned over time about 
which aspects of the simulations are quite model specific, about the sensitivity 
of  the conclusions to particular parameter  values, and about  the effects of 
alternative coordination proposals-including  those that rely on a judgmental 
or discretionary  application of  policies.  34 
MULTIMOD is documented fully elsewhere (Masson and others 1988),  and 
we  will  therefore  limit ourselves here  to describing its main  features. The 
model contains separate submodels for the three largest industrial countries- 
that is, for the United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany-for 
the remaining  four G-7 countries as a group (France, the United Kingdom, 
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group. Developing  countries  (excluding the high-income  oil exporters) are 
modeled as one region, but with some industrial disaggregation.  Each of the 
country or regional  submodels has equations explaining the components  of 
aggregate demand as well as the supply of the various goods produced.  The 
submodels are linked through trade and financial flows. The parameters of the 
behavioral equations are in most part estimated using  annual data available 
since the early  1960s. 
In the case of industrial countries, financial markets are assumed to exhibit 
both  perfect  capital  mobility  and  perfect  substitutability  between  assets 
denominated in different currencie~.~’  Consequently, arbitrage conditions link 
the returns on long- and short-term bonds and on domestic and foreign bonds. 
Moreover,  as  suggested  earlier,  expectations  are  assumed  to be  forward- 
looking and to be consistent with the model’s solution in future periods. Thus 
interest parity holds both ex ante and ex post in model simulations where future 
variables are correctly anticipated-that  is, where there are no “surprises” 
after the first simulation period.36 As a result, the change in the exchange rate 
between two currencies from one period to the next is determined by their 
interest differential prevailing in the first period. 
Similarly,  expected  long-term  bond  rates  and  rates  of  inflation  are  also 
consistent  with  the  model’s  solutions  for  future  periods  in  the  absence  of 
further shocks. The rate of  inflation-unlike  prices in financial markets-is  not 
assumed perfectly  flexible. Instead, rigidities in wage and product markets 
make for persistent effects on output as a result of purely monetary shocks; 
only in  the  medium  to long run will  full employment result.37 Thus, both 
monetary  and  fiscal policies of  the industrial countries have significant  and 
persistent effects on real variables, both in the country undertaking the policy 
change and in other countries. 
In order to provide some feel for the properties of MULTIMOD, table 1.1 
shows the effects of monetary  and fiscal policies in each of the three major 
countries on itself, on the other three major countries, and on the remaining 
G-7 c~untries.~’  These policy changes are assumed to be unanticipated at the 
time of initiation. Two comments are in order about the results. First, and not 
surprisingly,  policy  actions  taken  by  the  United  States  have  much  larger 
spillover effects than those undertaken in Japan or in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This reflects the large size of the U.S. economy and the fact that, 
while it is a relatively  closed economy to imports, a relatively large share of 
its imports come from other G-7 countries. Japan is only roughly half as large 
(in  terms  of  GNP)  and  obtains  more of  its  imports from outside  the  G-7 
sources. Germany is the most open but is smaller than Japan; the spillovers of 
its  actions  primarily  affect  other  European  countries.  Second, while  both 
monetary and fiscal policies have strong effects on domestic real output over 
the medium term, fiscal policy has a much larger own-effect on the current 
account than does monetary policy. 39 This is because the output and relative- 
price effects go in the same direction for a fiscal policy change, whereas they Table 1.1  Spillovers from Changes in Fiscal and Monetary Policies in MULTIMOD 
Real GDP"  Current balanceb  Real effective exchange rate" 
Country Taking  United  Other G-7  United  Other G-7  United  Other G-7 
Action  States  Japan  Germany  Countries  States  Japan  Germany  Countries  States  Japan  Germany  Countries 
Government Spending Increase of  1% of GNP in  1988" 
United States  1.2  0.5  -0.1  0.2  -  13  3  -I  3  1.5  -0.3  -0.1  -0.5 
0.6  0.6  0.1  0.6  -  18  6  -  7  1.8  -0.2  -0.4  -0.6 
Japan  -  1.5  -0.1  0.  I  1  -5  -  2  0.1  0.5  0.1  -0.3 
0.  I  0.6  -  0.3  I  -8  1  4  -0.1  0.9  -  -0.4 
Germany  0.  I  0.1  0.8  0.2  I  1  -6  2  -0.3  -0.2  0.7  -0.2 
0.  I  0.2  0.3  0.2  -  2  -5  3  -0.4  -0.3  0.9  -0.2 
Increase in Money Supply Target by  5% Relative to Baseline 
United States  1.2  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1  6  5  5  -  -  3.8  0.6  1.4  0.6 
0.8  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  6  5  6  -1  -2.1  0.3  1 .0  0.3 
Japan  -0.1  1.1  -  -  -1  3  -  -1  0.4  -2.2  0.3  0.6 
0.4 
Germany  -0.1  -  2.1  -  -1  -  -  I  I .2  0.8  -3.5  1 .o 
0.5 
-0.1  1.0  -0.1  -0.3  -1  6  -1  -4  0.3  -1.2  - 
0.5  -  1.8 
~  ~  -0.1  1.1  -0.2  -1  -I  -I  0.7 
Note: First and second rows for each entry correspond to first and third year domestic and foreign effects 
"Percentage deviation from baseline. 
hDeviation from baseline, billions of  dollars. 
'Temporary; each successive year is 708  of previous year's. 27  International Economic Policy Coordination 
offset  each  other  in  the  case of  monetary  policy.  A  fiscal  expansion,  for 
example, induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an increase in 
domestic demand-both  of which lead to a fall in net exports.40  In contrast, 
a monetary expansion yields a depreciation of the real exchange rate-which 
promotes net exports-and  an increase in domestic demand-which  penalizes 
them; because the relative-price effect dominates-at  least in the case of the 
United  States and Japan-the  result is a small improvement  in the  current 
account. 
1.4.1  Historical Simulations 
One rather minimalist interpretation of coordination is that large countries 
should  use their  monetary  and fiscal  policies  in a largely  independent  de- 
centralized way but should avoid sharp changes in policy stance that would, 
in turn, generate sharp changes in real exchange rates. Such a concession to 
internalizing  externalities  would  not  affect  the  ultimate  size of  the  stock 
adjustment  of  actual  to desired  policies  but  would  constrain  the  speed  of 
adjustment-much  in  the  same  spirit  that  speed  limits  in  boat  marinas 
discourage large boats from producing wakes that would topple smaller boats. 
One exponent of “smoothing” guidelines is Corden (1986,431), who states:41 
If we accept that the spillover effects of a foreign fiscal policy change can 
be defined as the adverse effects of the destabilization of the real exchange 
rate, two implications follow. 
The most important implication is that each country benefits the other by 
maintaining relatively stable policies, meaning policies which will minimize 
real  exchange-rate  changes in either  direction.  Coordination  consists es- 
sentially of  a reciprocal  agreement  to modify  policies  that  generate real 
exchange-rate instability. 
Figures  1.1 to 1.3 summarize developments for some indicators of policy 
stance since the first full year of generalized floating (1974), while figure 1.4 
gives a measure of real effective exchange rates for the G-7 countries.42 There 
are well-known  difficulties in getting good policy  indicators,  including the 
problem  that  each  of  the  series-money  growth, the  share  of  government 
purchases on goods and  services in GNP, and the ratio of tax receipts  less 
noninterest transfer payments to net national product and interest receipts-are 
all endogenous to some extent. It should also be emphasized that this historical 
period  contains  several different policy  regimes, ranging  from targeting  of 
monetary  aggregates  over much  of  the  earlier  part  of  the  period,  to  the 
strengthening of international economic policy  coordination  since the Plaza 
Agreement of September  1985. 
Nevertheless,  some useful  stylized facts emerge from an examination  of 
historical data. First, money growth rates are quite volatile and appear to be 
positively correlated across economies. Second, taxes net of transfers seem to 
exhibit more variation than government spending; evidence of fiscal stimulus 28  J. A. Frenkel/M. Goldstein/P. R. Masson 
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in the United States in 1983 is clear. Finally, real exchange rates exhibit large 
fluctuations, especially  for the United States. 
To  estimate the effects of  “smoother”  policies, each of  the variables  in 
figures 1.1 to 1.3 was replaced by its five-year moving average. Those values 
then were input as exogenous variables into MULTIMOD, and the values of 
endogenous variables were calculated. 
Table  1.2 presents  the mean and standard deviation of several macroeco- 
nomic indicators, comparing their historical values with those resulting from 
a simulation of smoother policies.  Interestingly enough, smoothing of policy 
variables  is  nowhere  near  sufficient  to  produce  smooth  values  for  major 
macroeconomic variables. On the contrary, such a simple smoothing rule tends 
to accentuate  some of  the  fluctuations  in the  historical  data. For example, 
though the average growth of  real gross domestic product is about the same as 
in the historical data, its standard deviation is higher in the policy smoothing 
simulation.  Real effective exchange rates  are somewhat less  variable  with 
smoothing, but real short-term interest rates are considerably  more variable. 
Table 1.2  MULTIMOD Simulations: Comparisons of Historical Policy Stance 
with Values of Endogenous Variables when Money Growth, Tax 
Rates, and the Stance of  Government Spending in GDP are 
Smoothed, 1974-1987 
Variable 
Mean Values  Standard Deviations 
Simulated  Simulated 
Historical  Values under  Historical  Values under 
Values  Smoothing  Values  Smoothing 
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This simulation illustrates that smoothing policy instruments may lead to 
less, not more, smoothness in target variables.  Other variables exogenous to 
the model are also a source of variation in output and exchange rates.  The 
model simulation suggests that the random shocks over the historical period, 
including changes in nonpolicy variables such as oil production,  have had a 
greater  influence  in  producing  swings in exchange rates  and  in  economic 
activity  than  economic  policy  variables.  The  role  of  policy  has been  to 
accommodate partially those shocks. For instance, money growth rates were 
increased initially after the first and second oil price shocks, but a permanent 
increase  was  resisted.  The  basic  point  is  that  the  variability  of  policy 
instruments has to a large degree been a response to shocks, rather than an 
exogenous  source of  in~tability;~~  put  in  other words,  the historical period 
already contains considerable smoothing-albeit  of a discretionary rather than 
rule-based variety-and  therefore attempts to impose additional smoothing on 
top of it do not produce salutary effects. 
Note also that real effective exchange rates take on values in this simulation 
that  are very  similar to the historical  data, though  they are somewhat less 
volatile when policy  is smoothed.  There seems to be little support here for 
the  notion  that exchange rate  stability  can be achieved  solely through  the 
application of simple mechanical smoothing rules.  Recall, however, that the 
smoothing  simulation  has only  considered  a  change  in the  path  of  policy 
variables-leaving  their  end  points  unchanged-rather  than  a  permanent 
change in those variables. A permanent increase in the rate of money growth 
or in the shares of taxes or government spending in output might have more 
powerful effects. 
A more activist approach to the coordination of economic policies would go 
beyond smoothing.  One such approach would be to postulate that monetary 
authorities resist movements of an intermediate variable-in  particular the real 
effective exchange rate-from  their long-run equilibrium levels. A system of 
target  zones  for exchange rates  has  been  proposed  by  Williamson  (1985 
[  19831) and extended by Williamson and Miller (1987). The original proposal 
calculated ‘‘fundamental equilibrium exchange rates”  and advocated the use 
of monetary policies to resist movements away from those rates. As explained 
by Williamson: 
The basic focus of exchange rate management should be on estimating an 
appropriate value for the exchange rate and seeking to limit deviations from 
that value beyond a reasonable range. (1985 [1983, 471) 
While other techniques,  like sterilized intervention,  may be able to give 
limited  assistance,  a  serious  commitment  to exchange rate  management 
leaves no realistic alternative to a willingness to direct monetary policy at 
least in part toward an exchange rate target. (56) 
More recently, Williamson and Miller (1987, 7) supplement the prescription 
that monetary policies be used to target real effective exchange rates with the 
assignment of fiscal policies to targets for the growth in domestic demand for 
the G-7 countries: “The basic argument is that a nominal income target fulfills 32  J. A. FrenkelIM. GoldsteinIP. R. Masson 
the same function as a money supply rule, providing a “nominal  anchor” to 
prevent inflation from taking off and a guide to expectations,  while avoiding 
the shocks to demand that come from variations in velocity.”  In addition, the 
proposal,  or  “blueprint,”  specifies  that  “the  average  level of  world  (real) 
short-term interest rates should be revised up (down) if aggregated growth of 
nominal income is threatening to exceed (fall short of) the sum of the target 
growth of nominal demand for the participating  countries .”  (2) 
Earlier simulation studies of target zones have been undertaken by William- 
son and Miller  (1987, App. C), based  on Edison, Miller,  and Williamson 
(1987).  Those  studies employed  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  multicountry 
model (MCM), which is characterized by adaptive expectations.  As empha- 
sized earlier, MULITMOD uses model-consistent forward-looking expectations 
a difference that should. in our view, produce more firmly grounded answers. 
Two simulations were  performed-one  for the  original target  zone pro- 
posal (labeled “target  zones”), and one for target zones augmented by a rule 
for fiscal policy (labeled “blueprint”).  The attempt was made to stay close to 
the  spirit of  the  original  proposals  while  still  making  a  few minor  modi- 
fications. 
Much of  the action in a target-zone scheme centers around the monetary 
reaction function since it is monetary policy that is typically assigned to the 
exchange rate. In the standard version of MULTIMOD, the reaction function 
for  short-term  interest  rates  involves  resisting  movements  away  from  an 
exogenous  target  for base money.  The demand for base money,  in turn, is 
assumed to depend on real GNP and on its deflator with elasticities close to 
unity. When the effects of target zones are simulated, this term is retained but 
with a much lower weight than normal.44 The “target-zone”  element in the 
reaction function is represented by the assumption that the short-term interest 
rate deviates from the baseline depending on the cube of the deviation of the 
real  effective  exchange  rate  from  its  target  value  (Edison,  Miller,  and 
Williamson  1987, 97).  Thus,  the  monetary  policy  rule  used  in  both  the 
target-zone and blueprint simulations takes the following algebraic form: 
R  = Rb + [(c -  c)/nI3  + a [fi - m], 
where, as in  Edison  and others (1987), R  is the  short-term  rate, Rh is  its 
baseline value, c is the log of the real effective exchange rate, C its target value, 
and n is half the width of the target zone, (namely, 10 percent); m is the target 
for the (log of  the) monetary base, m the long-run demand for the monetary 
base  with baseline interest rates but simulated output and prices,  and a is a 
negative constant.45 
Targets  for  the  real  effective  rate  were  taken  from  Williamson  (1985 
[ 1983]).46  As in Edison, Miller, and Williamson (1987), an adjustment to the 
level of the target real effective rate is made to keep it compatible with the 
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target  exchange rate variable follow the same path as in Williamson  (1985 
[ 1983]).47 
As mentioned earlier, the “blueprint”  proposes that fiscal policy follow a 
rule targeted on nominal domestic demand growth. As such, the equations in 
MULTIMOD for real government spending on goods and services had to be 
endogenized along such lines. The target paths for nominal domestic demand 
growth were taken from Williamson and Miller (1987) for the period 1980-87; 
outside that period,  we used their formula to calculate targets. 
The main results of interest are portrayed in figures 1.5  to 1.8, where actual 
(historical)  values  are  compared  to  simulated  values  for  the  target-zone 
proposal  and  for  the  blueprint  proposal.  The  figures  cover  real  effective 
exchange rates, real GNP growth rates, rates of inflation, and current account 
balances.  Bands  10 percent each side of Williamson’s  (1985 [ 19831) funda- 
mental equilibrium exchange rates have been drawn on figure  1.5. 
Several interesting-albeit  tentative-conclusions  emerge from the simu- 
lations. 
First, there is surprisingly little success in limiting real exchange rate move- 
ments  away  from  their  targets,  especially  for the  United  States.48 This  is 
apparent for both the more limited assignment of  monetary policy  to target 
exchange rates and the case where fiscal policy is made endogenous, though 
not specifically for exchange rate targeting. Also, the cost of resisting exchange 
rate movements in terms of greater variability of nominal interest rates appears 
to be quite high in the model. In 1985, the short-term rate in the United States 
is 370 basis points below its baseline value in the target-zone simulation, and 
260 basis points above in Germany. An attempt to increase the feedback onto 
interest rates of real exchange rates produced explosive behavior in the model 
and negative nominal interest rates.  Why is the movement  in real effective 
exchange rates so small? In the model, this is the result of the long-run neutrality 
of real variables with respect to monetary policy, of the relatively small impact 
of interest rates on exchange rates when exchange rates are anchored by perfect 
foresight, and  of  the  fact  that  monetary  policy  changes are anticipated  in 
advance. A nominal depreciation resulting from anticipated monetary expan- 
sion leads quite  soon to increases  in  import prices  and domestic inflation, 
reducing the amount of real depreciation.  Such a scenario has been discussed 
by Feldstein  (1988, 7) in the following terms: 
If the United States had agreed in 1983 to stop the dollar’s rise, the easiest 
way would have been for the Federal Reserve to ease monetary policy. . . . 
The easier monetary policy would produce inflation and the inflation would 
cause the dollar’s nominal value to decline.  In the end, there would have 
been no change in the real exchange rate or the trade deficit but a higher price 
level and a high rate of  inflation. 
With  perfect  foresight  of  policy  changes,  the  required  movements  in 
monetary  policy may be quite large for even small, and transitory,  real ex- 
change  rate  changes. It  can be seen from figure  1.5 that the  dollar’s real Williamson's target bands 
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effective  exchange  rate  is judged  by  Williamson  and  Miller  (1987)  to  be 
undervalued in  1978-80,  but overvalued from 1982 to  1985. Thus, interest 
rates have to rise in the earlier period but fall in the latter (relative to baseline). 
With  perfect  foresight,  the  amount  they  must  rise  in  the  earlier  period  is 
amplified  because  it  is  known  that  they  will  be  lower  later.49 Note  that 
monetary policy is effective in the model in the short run, provided  that the 
money supply change is unanticipated. Table 1.1 indicates that an increase in 
the money supply of 5 percent causes a real effective depreciation in the first 
year ranging from 2 percent in the case of Germany to 4 percent in the United 
States;  by  the  second  year,  the  depreciation  has  been  reduced  to  1 to  2 
percent.  If  anticipated beforehand,  the extent of  the depreciation  is further 
reduced. 
A second conclusion is that the use of monetary policy alone to maintain 
target zones-keeping  the same stance of  fiscal policy as in the baseline- 
seems to exacerbate  the  inflationary  pressures  of  the  late  1970s and  early 
1980s, and  to lead to more  variable  inflation  rates;  see figure  1.7. In this 
simulation,  the  United  States eases monetary policy to prevent  the dollar’s 
appreciation  in  1980-85;  with  perfect  foresight  of  such  a  policy  stance, 
inflation  rises  somewhat  in the  late  1970s in  anticipation.  Conversely,  the 
dollar’s undervaluation  in  1987  (according  to  the  calculated  fundamental 
equilibrium  exchange  rate)  requires  a tightening  of  policy,  which  tends  to 
lower inflation rates in the mid- 1980s below baseline levels. 
The substantial effects on real variables in the blueprint simulation appear 
to be the result  mainly of the fiscal rule. In the blueprint simulation,  GNP 
growth is smoothed considerably in the United States and the Federal Republic 
of  Germany  (see fig.  1.6). The recession  of  1982 and  the  high  growth of 
domestic demand in the United States in  1984 are both  smoothed out; U.S. 
GNP growth in 1984 is only 2.7 percent, compared to 7.2 percent historically, 
while the United States no longer experiences a recession in 1982. Moderation 
of  sharp GNP movements is however not so evident for Japan and the other 
(3-7 countries.  Indeed, the non-U.S. G-7 countries experience  large output 
variations in 1975-76  in the blueprint simulations. This may be a result of a 
mechanical application (in the period up to  1980) of the Williamson-Miller 
formula  for calculating  nominal  demand  targets;  if  adjusted  in  an  ad  hoc 
fashion (as is done in Williamson and Miller 1987 for the second oil shock), 
a more reasonable path might result. 
Third, current account imbalances are reduced for the major three countries 
in the blueprint simulation, in the sense of being closer to zero; see figure 1.8. 
Most of the effects again come as a result of the changes in fiscal stance. In 
particular,  targets  for domestic  demand  growth  in Germany and  Japan  are 
consistently  above  the  historical  values,  and  this  leads  to  a  much  more 
stimulative fiscal policy in these countries (see Williamson and Miller  1987, 
figs. 4 and 5). But again, there is a cost. General government fiscal deficits 
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By the same token, it is the fiscal stimulus-rather  than the monetary policy 
change-that  is the cause of  the sizable appreciation of  the yen and deutsche 
mark in the 1980s relative to baseline.  Clearly, such large deficits would be 
neither  desirable-nor  tolerable politically.  It  is  also noteworthy that  the 
counterpart to the smaller current account surpluses in Germany and Japan is 
larger surpluses in the other G-7 countries, rather than a reduction  of  U.S. 
deficits. This occurs because a weighted average of domestic demand targets 
for France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada in Williamson and Miller 
(1987) is consistently lower than actual demand over the period  1974-87. 
1.4.2  Single-Shock Simulations 
In our view, the results of the historical simulations are instructive.  Still, it 
is not clear to what extent these results reflect either the specific shocks that 
were present in the  1974-87  historical episode or the assumption made that 
all exogenous variables-including  the shocks-were  known prior  to their 
occurrence. Furthermore, because the historical data contain a great variety of 
shocks, interpretation of the simulation results is blurred. In what follows we 
do a set of simpler experiments with the model, where only one shock to a 
particular behavioral relationship  is assumed to occur. The shock, which is 
assumed to have been unanticipated  when it occurred, is an innovation that 
applies  to a  single period.  Though temporary,  the  shock  nevertheless has 
persistent  effects  because  errors  are  serially  correlated  and  because  the 
structural  equations of  the model  include  lagged effects.  Expectations  are 
assumed to be formed in the model in a way that properly takes into account 
the  subsequent dynamics;  that  is,  once  the  shock  has  occurred,  perfect 
foresight is assumed to prevail. 
No more than the historical simulations, results from single shocks do not 
allow a complete evaluation of policy rules. Clearly, the relative variance of 
various shocks should influence the choice among policy rules (Poole 1970; 
Henderson  1979). The historical  simulations that were discussed  above do 
capture the  relative  importance of  the  different  shocks,  but  only  for one 
historical episode. More informative  perhaps would be evaluation of policy 
rules under a series of drawings from the distribution describing the shocks-a 
subject  that  we hope to investigate in a  forthcoming paper.  Nevertheless, 
analyses of single shocks do  permit some intuition to be brought to bear on the 
issue of  policy choice; they should shed some light on when particular rules 
are likely to perform better than others. Ranking the rules would, however, 
generally  require  an  explicit objective  function  that  specifies  the weights 
attached to output fluctuations,  inflation, and other objectives. 
In  the  simulations reported below,  we expand the set of  policy  rules  to 
include not only simple and extended target-zone schemes, but nominal GNP 
and money targeting as well. It is implicitly assumed that nominal GNP and 
money targeting involve less coordination than target zones, although there is 
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demand  or money)  targets  might  be internationally  coordinated.  The four 
policy rules can be compactly summarized as: 
1. Money targeting: the short-term  interest rate is aimed at a target  for the 
monetary base; real government expenditure is exogenous. 
2. Nominal  GNP targeting, using the short-term interest rate.  Again, gov- 
ernment expenditure is exogenous. 
3. Target zones, using the short-term interest rate; the level of world interest 
rates is also adjusted up or down as a function of world nominal income. 
Government expenditure is exogenous. 
4.  Blueprint  proposal:  As  for  target  zones,  but  in  addition  government 
expenditure  is  aimed  at  a  target  for  nominal  domestic  demand  (i.e., 
absorption). 
To be more precise about the implementation of the alternative policy rules, 
consider the following equations where lower-case variables denote logs and 
upper-case variables represent levels. In particular, M is the monetary base (m 
is its logarithm), u is a random shock to the demand for money, Y is nominal 
GNP, WY is aggregate nominal income (in dollars) of industrial countries taken 
together,  Q  is  real  GNP,  P  is  the  GNP deflator,  A  is  nominal  domestic 
absorption,  G  is real  government  expenditure  on goods and  services,  C  is 
competitiveness (the relative price of domestic to foreign output), and R is the 
short-term interest rate. A b superscript indicates baseline values, which are 
also assumed to be the target values of the relevant variables. Implicitly then, 
the simulations start from a position of equilibrium, which is disturbed by the 
shock being considered.  The goal of each of the rules should be to return the 
economy as quickly and smoothly as possible to the initial equilibrium. 
(1) Money targeting: 
R  = Rb +  13.5 [md - mh] 
where md is long-run money demand, ignoring the effect of interest rates; md 
is given by: 
md = p  +  .970q + 5.15  u 
(2)  Nominal GNP targeting: 
R  = Rb + 25 [y -  yb] 
(3)  Target zones: 
(4) Blueprint: 
R  = Rb + [(c - ~~)/0.1]~  + 25 [WY -  wyh] 
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The form of the policy rules requires some explanation, especially since they 
differ slightly from those performed for the historical  period. In general, we 
have  attempted  to  follow  as  closely  as  possible  the  intentions  of  their 
advocates.  The  form  selected  resulted  from  some  experimentation  that 
identified  inadequacies  with alternative  specifications or with feedback  pa- 
rameters.  In  particular,  since policy  changes  have  lagged  effects  on their 
targets,  “instrument  instability”  may result if one attempts to hit the targets 
too closely period by period (Holbrook 1972). This applies most forcefully to 
the interest rate instrument, where caution needs to be exercised not to set the 
feedback coefficient too high. 
Rule (l), for money targeting, used the same specification as in the standard 
version  of  MULTIMOD.  If  a  money  target  were  exactly  achieved,  an 
implication would be an explosive, sawtooth pattern for short-term  interest 
rates. For this reason, equation (1) allows interest rates to equate the long-run 
demand for money (conditional on observed GNP) to the money stock target. 
The short-run demand for money can be written  as: 
m  = p  + .1883 q - .0070 R - .OO74 R  + .8058 (m -  p)  + u, 
where  u  is an  error term. Setting  m  = mb  and  solving  for R, on the  as- 
sumption that R  =  R  and rn  - p  =  (m -  p)-,,  yields 
R  = -  13.5 (mb -  p)  + 13.1 q -  69.4 u 
A rearrangement  of this equation, on the assumption  that the equation also 
holds in the baseline, gives rule (I) above. 
Nominal GNP targeting has been proposed by Tobin (1980) and others as 
preferable to money targeting because it avoids an inappropriate tightening or 
easing of monetary policy in response to velocity shocks. The form that such 
a  nominal  GNP target  might  take  has  been  discussed  by  Taylor  (1985b), 
Fischer (1988), and Tobin (1980). Rule (2) was specified in terms of a target 
for the level of nominal GNP, rather than its rate of change, because of the 
potential instability of the latter identified  in Taylor (1985b).  Some experi- 
mentation with feedback coefficients led to a value of 25. Since the interest rate 
is in percent,  this implies that a  1 percent deviation from the nominal  GNP 
target leads to a 25 basis point increase in the interest rate. Such a value yields 
a  flatter  aggregate  demand  schedule  (in  Q -  P  space)  for  nominal  GNP 
targeting than for money targeting (Taylor 1985b). Since the coefficient of real 
income is approximately  unity  in equation (l), the money rule can also be 
framed  in  terms of  nominal  GNP with  the  difference  that  the  error in  the 
demand-for-money equation would then also affect the setting of interest rates. 
Target zones, rule (3), follow the form described in Williamson and Miller 
(1987) and in Edison, Miller, and Williamson  (1987). There are some slight 
modifications relative to the historical simulations, such that the feedback rules 
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target zone is taken here to be 10 percent, not the 20 percent used in the historical 
simulation. The problems of nonconvergence that were present in our historical 
simulations did not surface here, allowing us to increase the reaction of short- 
term interest rates to deviations from fundamental equilibrium exchange rates. 
Also,  the  nominal  anchor  for  prices  is  the  target  level  of  world  nominal 
income-rather  than money supply targets. Note that it is the level, not the rate 
of change of world nominal GNP that appears in the equation, again reflecting 
Taylor’s (1985b)  findings. The feedback coefficient on world nominal GNP was 
taken to be the same as for domestic nominal GNP targeting. 
The extended target zones or “blueprint”  proposal,  rule (4), contains an 
equation for government spending that does not hit domestic-demand targets 
exactly. However, since the first-year multiplier effect on output of G is close 
to one, the rule allows approximate achievement of domestic-demand targets. 
So much for the policy rules. The (transitory) shocks that we consider are 
the following: 
(A)  A shock to the demandfor money-that  is, to velocity-in  the United 
States of  2 percent. 
(B) An aggregate supply shock in the United States; in particular, the residual 
in  the  equation  for  the  rate  of  change in  the  nonoil  GNP deflator  is 
increased by 2 percent. 
(C)  An aggregate demand shock in the United States: a positive innovation in 
consumption equal to  1 percent. 
(D) A shift in demand towards U.S. goods, equal to 10 percent of U.S. exports. 
(E) Aportfoliopreference shift out of U.S. dollar assets, leading to an increase 
Each of the rules is simulated subject to each of the five shocks, one at a time. 
Figures  1.9 to 1.12 give the main results of interest. 
The money demand shock is not plotted because the results are straightfor- 
ward to describe. It is only in the case of money targeting that the money shock 
has any effect on policy settings and on other endogenous variables (there is 
a  small  effect  of  the  money  shock  on  consumption  because  money  is  a 
component  of  net  wealth, but  the  magnitude  is  negligible).  In the case of 
money targeting,  the positive  innovation to money demand  leads to tempo- 
rarily  higher short-term  interest rates, and as a consequence, to temporarily 
lower economic  activity.  Other rules  ignore the money  demand  shock and 
maintain  policy  instruments unchanged;  macroeconomic  variables therefore 
remain at their equilibrium levels. This points up the superiority of these rules 
in the face of money demand shocks-an  argument similar to that made by the 
advocates  of  nominal  GNP targeting  (Tobin  1980). Of  course, if  shifts  in 
money demand could be identified, then the rule for targeting money could be 
modified to target a “shock-corrected”  money stock that omitted the term u. 
The aggregate supply shock (or cost-push inflation shock) yields a variety 
of  responses  (fig.  1.9).  This  shock  tends  to  put  upward  pressure  on  the 
domestic  output  price  relative  to  the  absorption  deflator,  leading  to some 
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(short-run) stimulus to consumption as well as higher inflation. As mentioned 
above, the greater flatness of the aggregate demand curve under nominal GNP 
targeting-vis-a-vis  money targeting-leads  to a greater response of interest 
rates and hence greater short-run output losses but smaller increases in prices. 
Which of the two rules is preferable depends on the trade-off between the two 
objectives of output and price level stability, as well as on the discount rate that 
captures  intertemporal  trade-off^.^' There is also a considerable  difference 
between responses under the target-zone and blueprint rules. Using monetary 
policy to counteract the real appreciation of the U.S. dollar requires lower, not 
higher, U.S. nominal  interest rates. However,  for both the target-zone  and 
blueprint  rules,  there  is  an  additional  term  (with  admittedly  an  arbitrarily 
imposed coefficient) that tends to raise interest rates if  world nominal  GNP 
grows too fast, which is the case here. Under target zones, the result is that 
U.  S. interest rates rise but by somewhat less than interest rates in other industrial 
countries. This leads to a small nominal dollar depreciation, which tends to add 
to inflationary pressures but limits output losses. In contrast, under the blueprint 
rule U.S. government spending contracts to counteract the stimulus to con- 
sumption, helping to limit the real appreciation of the dollar. The net effect on 
output is negative because domestic demand is close to its baseline value, but 
foreign demand falls. However, output is actually higher after seven years, by 
which time prices have returned to their baseline levels. The bottom line is that 
an aggregate supply shock causes a dilemma for the first three rules because 
one instrument has to wear two hats: that is, monetary policy has not only to 
resist inflationary pressures but also to neutralize output effects or resist the real 
exchange rate appreciation  in the country experiencing the sho~k.~' 
Next, consider the aggregate demand shock, namely, a  1 percent increase 
in U.S.  consumption (see fig. 1.10). Again, the effects differ under alternative 
policy rules. Absent any policy changes, such a shock will increase output and 
put upward pressure on prices, as well as appreciate the real exchange rate and 
lead to a decline in the current account. It also generates positive spillovers for 
the output of other countries. Since nominal GNP rises, as does the demand for 
money, both rules (1) and (2) cause interest rates to rise; again, given the relative 
steepness of the aggregate demand curves, the output and price increases are more 
moderate under nominal GNP targeting. Turning to the coordinated rules, the real 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar leads to a smaller rise in interest rates in the United 
States than in other industrial countries under target zones. However, by limiting 
the interest rate increases in the United States in response to a demand increase, 
this rule builds in inflationary pressures, which persist longer than for other rules. 
In contrast, the extra degree of freedom accorded by fiscal policy in the blueprint 
rule allows the aggregate demand shock to be almost completely offset by lower 
government spending. As a result, the output, price, and real exchange rate effects 
are smallest for this rule. 
Figure  1.11 presents  results  from an aggregate  demand shock that corre- 
sponds to a shift towards U.S. goods and away from other countries' goods. 43  International Economic Policy Coordination 
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The positive shock to U.S.  exports of  10 percent shows up in lower exports 
of  other countries in  proportions that  correspond  to  their shares in  world 
trade:*  the U.S. current account improves by  some $30 billion  in the first 
period. For all policy rules, U.  S,  real output rises initially, and price increases 
are relatively  small. The contrast  is greatest  in  the  behavior of  short-term 
interest rates. Neither  real exchange rates  nor world  nominal  GNP change 
much, so that there is little effect on interest rates under target zones or the 
blueprint.  However, money  and  nominal  GNP targeting  resist  the  rise  in 
activity and prices in the U.S. by raising interest rates. 
The final shock is to the exchange rate of  the dollar (against the yen, the 
deutsche mark, and other industrial country currencies) brought about by a 10 
percent  increase in  the required  return on dollar assets.  Output effects are 
largest for the two uncoordinated  rules (money and nominal GNP targeting) 
and least for the coordinated rule (the blueprint) that uses both monetary and 
fiscal instruments. The exchange rate overshoots under all four rules, with the 
U.S. nominal effective exchange rate depreciating by about 15 percent in the 
first year. Under target zones, the GNP deflator shows no signs of stabilizing 
(fig.  1.12). Under the  blueprint, higher  domestic demand results  from the 
income effect of higher exports; as a result, government spending must fall to 
achieve the  nominal  domestic-demand target. This leads  to a greater real 
depreciation of the dollar in the years 1990-96 than under the other rules, and 
a larger current account balance. 
To  sum  up,  there  are  five  basic  conclusions that  emerge  from  these 
simulations of  individual  shocks. 
First,  as in the historical  simulations, monetary  policy  is relatively  inef- 
fective when its subsequent effects are anticipated. This conclusion seems to 
follow whether or not the shocks themselves are anticipated. Conversely, fiscal 
policy-in  particular, variations in government spending-seems  to be quite 
powerful in influencing real output, real exchange rates, and current accounts. 
Clearly, then, a comparison of  rules that use both fiscal and monetary policy 
with those that just use monetary policy will favor the former. But there is a 
catch. The use of fiscal policy may not have the flexibility that is assumed for 
it  in,  say, the blueprint  rule.  It  may  be  constrained by  other objectives- 
including  the  need  to reduce budget  deficits  or to limit  the importance of 
government in the economy. As such, fiscal policy may not be able to react 
immediately to shocks, at least not within the one-year period assumed here. 
Second,  it  does appear that  the  behavior  of  alternative  policy  rules  in 
response to different shocks is quite different. Rules that perform best for some 
shocks may perform least well for others. In some cases, however, it is clear 
which  rule dominates (or which rules  dominate).  For  instance,  if  money 
demand shocks are prevalent, then  monetary  targeting  is  not  appropriate. 
Somewhat surprisingly, even when portfolio preference shifts are frequent, our 
results  do not  suggest  that  target  zones-implemented  through  monetary 
policy changes-would  be preferred.  Reliance on monetary policy to ensure 
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Third,  nominal  GNP targeting-while  it  dominates  money  targeting  if 
velocity shocks are prevalent-may  be subject to acute problems of instrument 
instability,  implying  that  an  attempt  at  close control  would  involve  large 
swings  in  interest  rates  from  period  to  period.  Because  of  the  relative 
ineffectiveness  of  monetary  policy  to affect real  magnitudes  in  the model, 
using monetary policy to target nominal GNP would have to allow for large 
deviations  from  targets.  It  is  therefore  unlikely  to be  very  precise.  As  a 
consequence,  the  advantages  for credibility  of  framing  policy  on  a  single 
indicator are apt to be diluted by the inability of the authorities to achieve close 
control of that indicator. Nominal GNP targeting could also make it too easy 
for authorities to walk away from their targets by citing forces “beyond their 
control.” 
Fourth, the simple target-zone proposal is also subject to the ineffectiveness 
of monetary policy. As a result, target zones that rely solely on monetary policy 
do not seem capable of maintaining real effective exchange rates within bands 
that are even 10 percent on either side of the target. While, we have considered 
only  arbitrary shocks, a comparison  with estimated variances  suggests that 
they are not out of line with historical experience. This relatively small impact 
of interest rates on real exchange rates in the model is due in large part to the 
twin properties that exchange rates are anchored by perfect foresight and that 
perfect foresight is assumed to prevail following the shocks. If the equilibrium 
level  of  the  exchange  rate  were  uncertain,  or  there  were  extrapolative 
expectations,  then  target  zones  might  have  greater  effectiveness.  Another 
important  consideration  is  that  for  some  shocks-in  particular,  a  supply 
shock-the  target zone would move monetary policy in a perverse direction. 
By resisting the real appreciation resulting from an inflationary shock, it would 
exacerbate those inflationary  pressures. 
Fifth and finally, target zones augmented by the use of the fiscal instrument- 
as outlined  in  the  biueprint  proposal-are  more successful  in limiting  the 
effects  of  shocks.  Its  greater  success  in  limiting  movements  away  from 
long-run equilibrium real exchange rates derives mainly however from the use 
of fiscal policy.  As suggested earlier, if fiscal policy is constrained by other 
objectives-or  cannot be used flexibly-then  the implied ability to counteract 
shocks may be illusory. Our results are an illustration of the point that it is 
clearly desirable to improve the flexibility of the budgetary process, whatever 
the objectives that guide fiscal policy. 
Notes 
1. Other definitions of coordination include: “decisionmaking that maximizes joint 
welfare and thus enables international interdependencies to be positively exploited” 
(Artis and Ostry 1986, 14); and “agreements between countries to adjust their policies 
in the light of  shared objectives or to implement policies jointly”  (Home and Masson 48  J. A. Frenkel/M. Goldstein/P. R. Masson 
1988, 261). A more general term is “cooperation,”  which includes policy coordina- 
tion, but also extends to exchange of information and consultation among countries. We 
do not address these issues of terminology in this paper. 
2.  See the  surveys by  Artis  and  Ostry (1986),  Cooper  (1985),  Fischer  (1988), 
Hamada (1979), Home and Masson (1988). Kenen (1987), Polak (1981), and Wallich 
(1984). 
3. Another key issue relating to mechanisms for coordination is that of hegemonic 
versus more symmetric systems; on this, see Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988). 
4. Evidence  on  the  size  of  spillover  effects  from  policy  actions  by  the  major 
industrial countries is discussed in the latter part of this section and in Table 1.1. 
5. The conclusion that a monetary expansion under floating rates affects real output 
in opposite directions at home  and abroad is associated  with the Mundell-Fleming 
model  (Mundell  1971; Fleming  1962). For  a recent  evaluation  of  this  model,  see 
Frenkel  and  Razin  (1987a);  a  broader  survey  of  the  international  transmission 
mechanism can be found in Frenkel and Mussa (1985). Econometric models are more 
divided on whether a monetary expansion under floating rates has negative transmission 
effects on real output abroad; see Helliwell and Padmore (1985) and Bryant and others 
(1988). 
6.  Corden (1986) has recently  argued that there may be a case for asking large 
countries to slow their speed of  adjustment to desired policy targets so as to dampen 
movements in real exchange rates that could cause difficulties for others (see sec. 1.4). 
7.  Another constraint on regional attempts to create more of the public good is that 
they may divert or discourage its production outside the region; the argument here is 
analogous to the concepts of  “trade creation”  and “trade diversion”  in the customs 
union literature. 
8. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to assume that each player does not have 
sufficient policy instruments to achieve all its policy targets simultaneously, and that 
coordination alters the trade-offs among policy targets; see Gavin (1986). Without those 
assumptions, the motivation for coordination would disappear. 
9.  See Goldstein (1984). This is not to say that the insulating properties of floating 
rates are inferior to those of  alternative regimes. Indeed, it is hard to see any other 
exchange rate regime surviving the shocks of the 1970s without widespread controls 
on trade and capital. 
10. See Bryant and others (1988) and Helliwell and Padmore (1985) for a comparison 
of open-economy multipliers from different global econometric models. Frankel and 
Rockett (1988) illustrate the sensitivity of welfare effects of coordination to the selection 
of the “right”  versus the “wrong”  economic model. 
11. See Fischer (1988). Dini (1988) goes further to argue that when the incentives 
to coordinate differ widely among group members, there may be a tendency for bilateral 
bargains to take place among those who have the most to trade. 
12.  See Putnam and Bayne (1984). At the same time, the Bonn Economic Summit 
of  1978 is regarded  in some quarters  as  illustrative of  the  pitfalls  of  coordinating 
macroeconomic policies when the economic outlook is changing rapidly. 
13.  Another example of high-frequency coordination is that among central banks of 
the largest countries on exchange-market intervention tactics. 
14. For example, the Louvre Communique  states that:  “The  United States Gov- 
ernment will pursue policies  with a view to reducing the fiscal  1988 deficit to 2.3 
percent of GNP from its estimated level of 3.9 percent in fiscal 1987. For this purpose, 
the growth in government expenditures will be held to less than 1 percent in fiscal 1988 
as part of the continuing program to reduce the share of government in GNP from its 
current level of 23 percent;”  see IMF (1987). 
15. Because coordination of  structural policies typically involves different policy 
instruments, individual country actions cannot-unlike  in the case of coordination of 49  International Economic Policy Coordination 
fiscal policies-be  evaluated with reference to an aggregate policy indicator that would 
be desirable from a global perspective. 
16. This is not to deny the helpful role that harmonization of structural policies- 
ranging from adopting  similar tax  provisions to implementing common regulations 
concerning movements of goods, labor, and capital-could  play in  certain  circum- 
stances. 
17. Those who hold the view that international factors have minimal influence on 
policymaking sometimes also argue that countries’ policy commitments in coordination 
agreements represent policies that would have occurred even in the absence of  such 
agreements. Under this view, coordination affects only the timing of policy announce- 
ments, with countries delaying such announcements until coordination meetings so that 
they can present a dowry to the others. 
18. See the papers in Buiter and Marston (1985). 
19. As Poehl(l987, 19-20)  notes: “international cooperation does not necessarily 
imply that all parties must agree on all details at all times. It is important that we regard 
it  as a process of  maintaining  stability in our increasingly  interrelated world econ- 
omy. . . . The process of  international cooperation may be difficult and burdensome, 
even frustrating at times, but there is no alternative to it.” 
20.  It  is  precisely  because  of  the  risk  of  “collusion”  among  the  coordinating 
countries that Vaubel (1  985) favors decentralized decision-making. 
21.  It is in this context that the problems of  time inconsistency and moral hazard 
often surface. 
22.  Advocates  of  rules  also  argue  that  once  the  public  knows  better  what  the 
authorities will do, markets will demand less of a risk premium to hold the authorities’ 
financial obligations. 
23. Kenen (1 987) cites a regression of the change in the inflation rate between 1979 
and  1985 on the level of the inflation rate in  1979 and a zero-one dummy variable 
denoting  participation  in  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  of  the  EMS.  The  sample 
comprised  twenty-two  industrial  countries.  The  EMS  dummy  variable  was  not 
statistically significant, whereas the level of  the inflation rate in 1979 was. Note that 
this  finding  does  not  preclude  a  helpful  role  of  the  EMS  in  disinflation  since 
participation  could  still have reduced  the  output  cost  of  disinflation (Giavazzi and 
Giovannini 1988); but this is a different story. 
24.  As developed in Polak (1988), the need for rules to guard against the dangers 
of fine-tuning has receded in any case since economic policy in most industrial countries 
is  now  oriented  much  more  toward  the  medium  term.  Fischer  (1988)  makes  the 
complementary point that the state of our knowledge about the effects of monetary and 
fiscal policy is too rudimentary to justify policy rules. Niehans (1987) expresses doubts 
that rules could be relied upon to reduce international disturbances. 
25.  On the limitations of purchasing-power-parity rules, see Frenkel (1981). 
26.  Multiple  indicators  can  reflect  multiple  targets  and/or multiple  instruments 
employed to reach a smaller number of targets. 
27.  The literature on “speculative attacks”  deals with just this phenomenon; see, 
for example, Flood and Garber (1980). 
28.  See Frenkel and Goldstein (1986). This missing link between exchange rate 
movements  and  fiscal policy  under  target  zones  is being  increasingly  recognized. 
Whereas first-generation target-zone proposals spoke only of monetary policy, second- 
generation proposals have added a policy rule or guideline for fiscal policy; contrast 
Williamson (1985 [1983]) with Williamson and Miller (1987). Also, see the simula- 
tions of  simple versus extended target-zone rules in section  1.4. 
29.  See Oudiz and Sachs (1984), McKibbin and Sachs (1988), and Taylor (1985a) 
for evidence on the size of  the gains, and Frankel and Rockett (1988) for the effects 
of using the “wrong”  model. 50  J. A. Frenkel/M. Goldstein/P. R. Masson 
30.  See Schultze  (1988)  and  Bryant  and  others  (1988).  As  an  example  of  the 
difficulties  associated  with  identifying  the  “counterfactual,”  contrast  Feldstein’s 
(1988) appraisal of the likely evaluation of exchange rates in the absence of the Plaza 
Agreement with that of Lamfalussy (1987). 
31. Frankel and Rockett (1988), however, show that, for a set of  models compared 
in Bryant and others (1988), gains from knowing the “true”  model (assuming that one 
is correct) dominate gains from coordination. 
32.  Another recent paper, Taylor (1986), considers different exchange rate arrange- 
ments in  a rational  expectations  model;  however, only completely  fixed and  freely 
floating exchange rates are compared, and the model is limited to  the seven major 
industrial countries. 
33. The model simulations do not, however, allow for two other ways in which private 
sector behavior may be affected by changes in policy regimes. First, the variance of output, 
prices, or exchange rates may be different, leading to different degees of substitutability 
among goods or assets. For example, it has been argued that the greater variability of 
exchange  rates has led to a lower level of international trade than would have prevailed under 
fixed rates. Second, expectations may contain ‘‘speculative bubbles”  in  some circum- 
stances, and hence may not solely reflect economic fundamentals. For example, the rise 
of  the U.S. dollar early in  1985 despite declining interest rate differentials in favor of 
dollar-denominated assets is hard to explain. 
34.  Although simulation studies of judgmental coordinated policies are somewhat 
more difficult to design than analyses of rule-based proposals, a start in this direction 
has been made in some internal studies by  Fund staff. 
35.  In contrast to the industrial countries, developing countries are not assumed to 
face perfect capital markets. Instead, the availability of financing reflects their ability 
to service debt, as measured by a ratio of their inflation-adjusted interest payments to 
the value of their exports. It is assumed that there is an upper limit to this ratio, beyond 
which the risk of nonrepayment becomes high, and consequently creditors would refuse 
to  grant  further new  lending.  As  a result  of  the  financing constraint,  imports  by 
developing countries are  also constrained, tending to reduce both consumption and 
investment.  The  constraint  on  financing  is,  however,  not  solely  based  on  current 
developments, but also reflects an assessment of future export prospects of developing 
countries; expected future exports are made to be consistent with the model’s solution 
for those future exports. 
36.  This is a feature that will be relaxed in future work-in  particular, by imposing 
shocks to residuals in successive periods. 
37.  Labor  markets  do not  appear explicitly  in  the  model,  but  features  of  wage 
bargaining, such as those due to overlapping multiperiod contracts, are reflected in the 
equation estimated for inflation. 
38.  The properties of MULTIMOD for these policy changes are quite similar to the 
average for other existing multicountry models; see Fischer (1988, 16). 
39.  One strong implication of this empirical regularity is that any “assignment rule” 
that assigns monetary policy to the current account-for  example, Williamson  and 
Miller’s (1987) blueprint-is  going to face problems; on this point, see Genberg and 
Swoboda (1987) and Boughton (1988). 
40.  It is assumed here that fiscal expansion is not accommodated by  an increase in 
money growth. Current account effects also reflect the impact of interest rate changes 
on net investment income. 
41.  Niehans (1987, 215) also stresses the importance of steady policies: “The first, 
and most promising,  step to reducing  international disturbances  must surely be  the 
avoidance of the policy shifts that produce them. Especially for the dominant economy, 
the United States, the most important part of  cooperation is steadiness.” 51  International Economic Policy Coordination 
42.  The measure of real effective exchange rate is the country’s manufactured export 
price,  divided  by  a  weighted  average  export  price  of  its  competitors,  including 
developing countries. Thus, an increase indicates appreciation. 
43.  Corden (1986, 431) recognizes this to some extent:  “[Coordination]  means, 
incidentally, that  if  private  investment  in  a country  declines there  should  be  some 
compensating increase in its fiscal deficit to modify the current account effect. It does 
not necessarily mean that a fiscal policy stance should be stable.” 
44.  The role of this variable is to give a nominal anchor to the system. The inclusion 
of this term is also consistent with the intent of the blueprint proposal to make the level 
of  interest rates depend (in an unspecified fashion) on the growth of aggregate GNP. 
45.  In implementing the rule, the value given by  Edison, Miller, and Williamson 
(1987) to n, 10 percent, was initially tried, but the model either would not solve or gave 
negative nominal interest rates. Consequently, a higher value, 20 percent, was used, 
implying a lower feedback of exchange rate misalignments on interest rates. 
46.  Again,  we adopt Williamson’s  (1985) estimates of  target or equilibrium real 
effective exchange rates merely to stay as close as possible to the original proposals. 
There should be no implication that we agree or disagree with those estimates. For a 
discussion of some of the difficulties associated with calculating equilibrium exchange 
rates, see Frenkel and Goldstein (1988b). 
47.  It should also be noted that MULTIMOD’s definition of real effective exchange 
rates is wider than most measures, since it allows for competition from manufactures 
produced in developing countries. 
48.  It is also the case in Edison, Miller, and Williamson (1987), that real exchange 
rates under a target zone regime differ little from their historical values. 
49.  Suppose there are three time periods and that interest parity relates interest rates 
and exchange rates.  Suppose also that the exchange rate is unchanged in the third 
period. In each period, the interest rate differential is equal to the appreciation that is 
expected for (and actually occurs in) the next period. Thus, in terms of deviations from 
baseline,  d, = e,,, - e,, where  e3 = 0. Then  in  the  second period,  the  interest 
differential will have to be equal to the desired change in the exchange rate; if  it is 
overvalued by 5 percent, interest rates will have to be 5 percentage points lower. If in 
the first period the exchange rate is undervalued by  5 percent, then interest rates will 
have to be not 5, but  10 percentage points, higher. 
50.  As shown in Buiter and Miller (1982), if the model has the natural rate property, 
then the cumulative output losses from different disinflation policies are the same when 
discounting is ignored. 
5 1.  If there is no feedback of inflation onto monetary policy-such  as through world 
nominal  income-then  the  target-zone  rule  cannot  be  simulated  in  MULTIMOD 
because of the absence of a nominal anchor. 
52.  The shock is distributed using the weights that serve to allocate the world trade 
discrepancy in MULTIMOD. As a result, the shock to the United States is also reduced 
by the U.S. share of world trade, so that U.S.  exports rise on impact by 8.6 percent, 
not the full 10 percent. 
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Comment  Martin Feldstein 
Jacob Frenkel  and his  colleagues at the International  Monetary  Fund  have 
presented  not  just  an  interesting  paper,  but  what  are essentially  two very 
interesting, but quite incompatible, papers. In the first of these, they analyze 
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different types of macroeconomic coordination,  summarizing the arguments 
for  and  against  coordination,  but  focusing  on  the  arguments  in  favor  of 
coordination of the type now practiced by the G-7 finance ministers: discre- 
tionary ad hoc agreements, the absence of any explicit policy response rules, 
a vague multitarget process,  and an emphasis on exchange rate targets. 
In their second “paper,”  the authors present a fascinating empirical analysis 
of the results of five possible ways to formalize exchange rate stabilization and, 
more generally, macroeconomic coordination. My reading of their evidence is 
that none of these rules would lead to satisfactory economic performance.  In 
the  historic  simulations  that  they  present, the  proposed  rules  lead  to  wild 
fluctuations of  exchange rates or interest rates. Moreover, the fiscal policies 
that would be required to stabilize real  exchange rates  would call upon the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Japan to have budget deficits of more than 
8 percent  of GNP. The single-shock simulations also give little reason to be 
sanguine about coordination efforts unless fiscal policy can be coordinated, 
something that clearly has not been achieved between the United States and 
Germany  and, as the authors note, has not  even been  achieved  among the 
countries that participate  in the EMS. 
I describe these as two incompatible papers because I do not see how, given 
the evidence of these simulations, Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (FGM) can 
be at all sanguine about the usefulness of  macroeconomic  coordination  and 
attempts at exchange rate stabilization. 
Indeed, even without their simulation analyses, I cannot agree with their 
optimistic view of the potential advantages of macroeconomic  coordination. 
There may be a case for quiet information exchange and discussion of the type 
that  takes  place  at  the  monthly  meetings  of  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements or the periodic meetings of the OECD’s Working Party 3. But the 
attempts  to  go  beyond  the  exchange  of  information  and  to  coordinate 
macroeconomic policy and exchange rates in the manner of the G-7 meetings 
is, I believe, unwise. 
It  could, of course, be  argued  that  the FGM empirical  evidence  against 
explicit coordination  is not very  persuasive because the econometric  model 
(IMF’s MULTIMOD) is, as the authors stress, still very preliminary. More- 
over, the perfect  foresight  character  of  the  model  and the  assumption  that 
announcements  of  government  policies  are  completely  believed  are  both 
substantial  departures  from reality.  And,  although  the  authors  refer  to the 
Lucas (1976) critique, they do not deal with it even though it is particularly 
important  in  the  present  context, in  which  the  proposed  policies  are  very 
different  in  character  from  the  ones that  prevailed  during  the  period  that 
generated the data on which their estimates are based. 
But the inadequacy of existing modeling capability should hardly be comfort 
to  advocates  of  coordination.  If  the  best  model  that  the  IMF has  is  still 
preliminary and far from reliable, it is hard to see how governments can have 
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Although FGM offer the common observation that the growth of trade has 
increased economic interdependence, the evidence that they present in table 1.1 
shows that the interdependence is so small it can hardly be used to support the 
case  for U.S.  participation  in a  macroeconomic  coordination  process.  For 
example, if Germany and Japan both increase their government spending by 
1 percent of GNP, the impact in the United States would be a real GNP rise 
of only 0.2  percent or about $10 billion. 
The large fiscal changes that would be needed to have any substantial real 
impact are likely to be strongly resisted unless they also serve domestic goals 
(in which case they would be achieved without the coordination process). The 
authors implicitly recognize this when they say that fiscal instruments may 
enter the social welfare functions of countries.  And well they should, since 
changes in tax rates alter excess burdens and income distribution; changes in 
government  spending increase  or decrease  benefits  to current  citizens;  and 
changes in deficits imply changes in future debt service, with the correspond- 
ing excess burdens. 
I believe that FGM are also overly optimistic about the nature of  the G-7 
agreements. They write as if they believe that the official communiquts issued 
reflect what ministers actually believe and what governments will actually do. 
A more accurate assessment would regard the G-7 communiquts as politically 
convenient declarations.  Let us look at the two examples which FGM select 
to illustrate their case. 
In 1978, at the Bonn Summit, Germany and other governments committed 
to accelerate their growth rates in exchange for a commitment by the United 
States  to come to  grips  with  its  inflation  problem.  In  fact, U.S.  inflation 
continued to rise for three more years. It was eighteen months after the Bonn 
Summit that Paul Volcker persuaded the Federal Reserve and President Carter 
to impose a tighter monetary policy,  and even this was soon reversed under 
pressure from President Carter. The Reagan administration’s support in 198  1 
for tough anti-inflationary policies was totally unrelated to the earlier Summit 
discussions. 
FGM also cite the specific promise of the United States at the February 1987 
Louvre  meeting  of  the  G-7 finance  ministers.  The communiqut not  only 
promised a reduction of the U.S. budget deficit, but also specified that it would 
be reduced to 2.3 percent of GNP in fiscal year 1988 by containing the growth 
of  government  spending. This was,  of  course,  only  a  restatement  of  the 
recently proposed Reagan budget  for FY1988 and not at all a reflection  of 
the likely outcome of the upcoming negotiations with Congress.  In the end, 
the FY1988 deficit was 3.2  percent of GNP, despite surprisingly fast economic 
growth between  1987 and  1988. The actual deficit rose between these two 
years. 
Although I understand that there are ambiguities in interpreting economic 
policies, I doubt that any budget action that the United States has taken since 
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the American  system of  government makes it  clear that the U.S. Treasury 
secretary  cannot reliably  promise any  change  in  either  monetary  or fiscal 
policy. 
I am also very skeptical of the credit that the authors give to the 1985 Plaza 
Accord (see sec. 1.4) for either the reduction of the dollar or the reduction of 
protectionist pressures in the United States. Even a cursory examination of the 
exchange rate data shows that the value of the dollar fell as rapidly in the six 
months before the Plaza meeting  as it did in the six months after the Plaza 
meeting. Although it is hard to assess what protectionist pressures would have 
been if the dollar had not fallen, there can be no doubt that the 1988 trade bill 
is a remarkably protectionist  piece of  legislation. 
In my  judgment  the  G-7 summits and  finance  ministers,  meetings  and 
communiquts are basically  empty political  gestures that  are useful  to the 
political figures involved, but of no substantive importance. That in itself is 
probably  a  good  thing,  because  effective  coordination  of  policy  would 
probably have increased inflationary pressures during the past several years. 
For example, the pressure on the United States to reduce the value of the dollar 
during 1982 through  1984, if it had been  effective, would  have forced the 
Federal Reserve to adopt a more inflationary monetary policy. 
There are several other ways in which the current G-7 process is actually 
counterproductive.  First, the emphasis on macroeconomic coordination  and 
exchange rate management deflects attention from other less glamorous areas 
where cooperation could be helpful, including the LDC debt problem, trade 
conflicts, and cross-border  environmental issues. 
Second, the emphasis on interdependence and the responsibilities of  “other 
countries” to contribute to the solution of our macroeconomic problems causes 
antagonism. Now the United States tells other countries that they must change 
their  monetary  and fiscal policies  to assist us or accept  the  adverse conse- 
quences that we can impose on them. Secretary Baker repeatedly asserted in 
1986 that if Germany and Japan did not pursue more expansionary policies, 
the United States would punish them by depressing the value of the dollar and 
thus the trade balances of  those countries. How will Americans react if  the 
Japanese tell us in some future year that we must change our domestic policies 
to help them or suffer the consequences that they can impose on us? 
Third, the  emphasis on interdependence  provides  a political  excuse for 
inaction. The coordination  process provides  domestic policy  with  a  handy 
scapegoat.  If the U.S. economy performs  badly,  the blame  is shifted  from 
domestic policies to the actions of Germany and Japan. 
Finally, business and portfolio investors can be frightened into inappropriate 
action  by  the notion  that  our economy will  suffer unless  we  have  active 
cooperation from other major industrial countries. That sentiment contributed 
to the stock market crash in October 1987. Fortunately, immediately after the 
crash both Alan Greenspan and James Baker indicated that the value of the 59  International Economic Policy Coordination 
dollar would no longer be a goal of economic policy,  which would  instead 
focus on the domestic economy. 
As these comments indicate, my reading of the paper by Frenkel, Goldstein, 
and Masson has only reinforced my skepticism about international macroeco- 
nomic coordination.  The analytic arguments  offer no new reasons to favor 
integration; the measures of interdependence show that we can easily achieve 
the desired shifts in macroeconomic stimulus without foreign assistance; and 
the simulation results show that no policy reaction process that FGM could 
devise would improve either the historic performance of the world’s economy 
or the prospective reaction to individual shocks. 
Quiet discussions of economic policy among key government officials of the 
major countries are no doubt a good thing. Times may even exist when joint 
action is clearly of  mutual interest.  But the current public proclamations of 
macroeconomic coordination as a regular aspect of policy and formal schemes 
for exchange rate management are a bad idea. There is nothing in this paper 
to make us believe otherwise. 
Note 
1. For a more complete statement of  these views, see M. Feldstein, Distinguished 
lecture on economics in government: Thinking about international economic coordi- 
nation. Journal of  Economic Perspectives 2 (Spring 1988): 3- 13. 
Comment  William H. Branson 
This paper by Jacob Frenkel, Morris Goldstein, and Paul Masson (FGM) is 
broad-ranging and informative. It thoroughly covers the rationale, scope, and 
mechanisms of coordination, or rather, as I argue below, cooperation, as seen 
from the perspective of the IMF or the G-7. This is in contrast to much of the 
literature on coordination in economics, which focuses on technical aspects of 
game theory. In a sense, here we see coordination as perceived by practitioners 
who are fully aware of the technical issues that are involved in its analysis, but 
leave them  submerged.  As a result,  the paper is very  readable  and  will be 
widely read. The paper also gives us a nice exercise in the use of the IMF’s 
MULTIMOD world model to analyze alternative policy regimes. This, too, is 
clear and readable, and provides good exposure for MULTIMOD. Thus both 
the  discussion  of  coordination  issues  and  the  simulation  study  are  useful 
additions to our knowledge. 
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I will begin with FGM’s definition of coordination,  and put it in a broader 
context of international economic cooperation.  FGM, in my view, generally 
discuss  the  looser  concept  of  cooperation  rather  than  coordination  as the 
authors define it. As I go through my comments on the paper’s substance,  I 
will point out why this is my view. This does not detract at all from the value 
of  the  paper’s discussion  of  cooperation,  but  it  does  refocus  the  paper 
somewhat.  At the end of the comment, I will come back to some thoughts 
about  why  economists  have  such  peculiar  difficulties  with  the  concept  of 
coordination. 
The paper  begins  with  the  well-known  definition  by  Henry  Wallich  of 
coordination as “a significant modification of national policies in recognition 
of international economic interdependence.’ ’  This is a useful definition, which 
the following quotation  from Lamberto Dini (1988,  1) puts  into a broader 
context: 
I find it useful  . . . to distinguish between cooperation and coordination. 
Cooperation basically involves information exchange, consultation among 
authorities,  and possibly common assessments of the international reper- 
cussions of  national policies.  Coordination means that policy-makers in a 
number of  countries  agree on common objectives and together take joint 
policy decisions that differ from those they would have taken on their own. 
Conflict  is  . . . the opposite of coordination.  It may  arise . . . when  no 
consideration  is  given  to  the  international  dimension  of  national  poli- 
cies. . . . We  can view international cooperation  as a continuum ranging 
from  coordination,  the  highest  level  of  cooperation,  to  conflict,  when 
cooperation breaks down. 
In the context set by Dini, the FGM paper is mainly about cooperation. 
The discussions in the numerous international forums that are examined in 
the  paper  are  examples  of  cooperation, using  the  Dini  and  the  Wallich 
definitions. The argument for an ongoing process is a persuasive one, if applied 
to cooperation,  with occasions  within the process  that call for coordinated 
action.  The discussion  of  rules  versus  discretion  seems  to  be  half  about 
coordination (rules) and half  about cooperation  (discretion), and the choice 
between single and multiple indicators is applicable to an ongoing process of 
cooperation. 
The simulations using MULTIMOD provide some interesting and surprising 
results. FGM’s table 1.1  shows the basic policy multipliers from MULTIMOD 
solutions for the United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The GDP  results show minimal interdependence between the United States and 
Germany, and substantial effects on Japan from the United States, but not vice 
versa. One can see here the source of some results that indicate that the gains 
from  coordination  would  be  small.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  these 
multipliers with Germany replaced by a European aggregate.  I would expect 
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The second set of interesting results comes from the exercise in which the 
policy variables in the history are smoothed in the simulation, on the supposition 
that smoother policy would give smoother outcomes.  This supposition is suspect 
on at least two grounds. First, there were substantial exogenous shocks, such 
as oil price changes, during the  1974-87  simulation period.  Second, with 
forward-looking  expectations,  which  MULTIMOD  features, the  announce- 
ment of a gradual policy  shift in  the future should cause interest rates and 
exchange rates to jump at the time of the announcement. We saw this effect 
with the Reagan  budget program  in  1981. As FGM note, the result of the 
simulations is the opposite of the supposition. In FGM’s table 1.2  we see that 
smoothing  policy  has  little  effect  on  the  mean  outcomes  for  the  target 
variables, but that it generally increases the standard deviations! Thus during 
the 1974-87 period, on average, monetary and fiscal policy were stabilizing, 
according to MULTIMOD. This is an encouraging result for new-Keynesian 
activists. 
Next, FGM go on to simulations of target zones and the Williamson-Miller 
blueprints. The most notable result here is the effect of the blueprints on current 
account balances, shown in FGM’s figure 1.8. FGM note that the target zones 
and blueprints reduce the current imbalances of the three major countries, but 
the effect on the United States is very small. My impression from figure 1.8 
is that the target zones or blueprints shift the counterpart  of the U.S. deficit 
from Germany and Japan to the other G-7 countries. The last set of  simulations 
shows the effects  of  various  single  shocks in  the  United  States under  four 
alternative policy rules. The results are shown in FGM’s figures  1.9- 1.12. 
The blueprint results  mainly  stand  out due to the stabilizing  effects of  the 
flexible U.S. fiscal policy that they assume. Since MULTIMOD appears to be 
a new-Keynesian model, this is not surprising. But the results do emphasize 
how important this assumption about fiscal policy is for the operation of the 
blueprints. 
Finally, I return to the question of why economists have such difficulty with 
the idea of coordination. After all, theorists and practitioners in many disparate 
fields find coordination to be the natural state of  affairs.  Arms  negotiators, 
international health officials, air traffic controllers, museum curators, and even 
the International Olympic Committee all coordinate; why shouldn’t economic 
policymakers? I think an indication of the resolution of this seeming conun- 
drum can be found in the two quotations that begin the FGM paper. 
Martin Feldstein focuses on a very narrow scope for coordination,  namely 
macroeconomic policy, and the possibility that international coordination will 
distract  attention  from  the  effort  needed  to  get  domestic  policy  right. 
Presumably  the  cost of this distraction  is larger than  the  small gains  from 
macroeconomic policy coordination, in Feldstein’s view. James Tobin takes a 
wider view, with economic warfare within his horizon.  He, like the interna- 
tional health officials, thinks some form of coordination is almost inevitable. 62  J. A. FrenkelIM. GoldsteinIP. R. Masson 
The economist’s problem seems to come from narrowing  the scope for 
coordination so much that the gains from trade are virtually eliminated. Why 
do we do this?  Perhaps,  in  order to reduce  the  problem  to a  size  that  is 
manageable with the available tools, usually game theory, we have to squeeze 
it  down so much that  the  substance vanishes.  This difficulty  shows up  in 
FGM’s inability to stick to their own definition of coordination. To make things 
interesting, as they do, and go  beyond a game-theoretic analysis, they properly 
expand their horizon to cooperation, as Lamberto Dini defined it. The next step 
would be an analysis of the optimal scope for coordination. 
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